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MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE: TWO APPROACHES

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[Article by B. D. Pyadyshev]

[Text] Our nation is preparing for a great event--the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State and the consistently and tirelessly implemented Program of Peace, worked out at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, are arousing increasingly close and grateful interest throughout the world in the present atmosphere of international complexities and active attempts by imperialist circles to torpedo detente. The people of the world view the very existence of the Soviet Union and its "peaceful offensive" along the entire front of extremely complex international problems as a guarantee of the successful outcome of the struggle for the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, for the limitation of the arms race and for the complete eradication of the threat of nuclear war.

The foreign and military policy of the United States, which has once again openly embarked upon the escalation of tension and the use of force in the international arena, pursues different goals. Above all, it is increasing the danger of nuclear conflict. The processes connected with the policy conducted by Washington and the NATO military bloc in general are clearly reflected in the situation impeding the development of military detente in Europe.

I

The maxim that "peace is indivisible" has entered many diplomatic books. And this is true. There can be no lasting peace if the fires of war are burning somewhere, the sovereign rights of people are being restricted and the security of states is being threatened. The cause of world peace is affected by events in any part of the planet. In particular, the importance of maintaining and reinforcing normal conditions in Europe is unparalleled. This is where the two world wars began and took the lives of millions of people in many countries outside Europe. Any complication of the situation in Europe invariably affects the state of affairs in other regions.

The imperialist NATO bloc founded three decades ago by the United States stimulated the creation of a system of military alliances and groups, the establishment of huge quantities of American military bases in the Near and Middle East, Asia and Latin America and the energization of forces for militarism and colonialism. The

spark of a military conflict in Europe would be highly dangerous for the Europeans and for the people of any non-European country: Given the present oversaturation of Europe with nuclear missiles and other weapons, it could light a fire of such intensity that its effect on all mankind would be difficult to predict.

At the same time, it is precisely in Europe, happily and fortunately for the people of all other regions, that the process of international detente and broader intergovernmental cooperation on the principles of equality and peaceful coexistence by states with differing sociopolitical structures has produced the most tangible results. The prime mover of this process is known--the powerful community of socialist states, the energetic collective efforts of the fraternal countries to implement the Program of Peace of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and the struggle of all peaceful forces to alleviate tension.

At the end of the 1970's detente in Europe and its favorable effect on conditions in other parts of the world began to be subjected to mass-scale attacks by advocates of cold war, centered around the U.S. military-industrial complex and the NATO bloc. A statement by the head of the Washington administration on 4 January 1980 and the State of the Union Message of 23 January 1980 declared an official "crusade" against the Soviet Union and the countries of real socialism with the use of the most extreme types of political and economic blackmail and pressure, stopping just short of cannonfire. The entire campaign in the United States this year was accompanied by loud militaristic outcries, and it would be difficult to say whether it was the Republicans or the Democrats who made the loudest promises to escalate the arms race even more.¹

The meeting of the NATO Military Planning Committee in Brussels in May, attended by defense and foreign ministers, and the regular June NATO Council session in Ankara were used by the United States to demand that its European allies demonstrate their "unity and solidarity" around the White House's present policy in the international arena. Washington was striving (and, as the results of these forums testify, was largely successful) to escalate the arms race and military preparations in Western Europe, called the "European theater of military operations" in Pentagon and NATO documents, and to involve its allies in adventuristic actions in the Near and Middle East.

It must be stressed that detente is passing the test. Moreover, the line of detente has been strongest in Europe, where the opponents of cooperation have directed their main strike. But this is also where the efforts of the socialist countries have been concentrated in their struggle for peace and disarmament. This is attested to by the entire, although complex, development of the European situation since the end of the all-Europe conference in Helsinki, the fifth anniversary of which was commemorated by the world public this summer. "The present international complications are heightening, and not diminishing, the significance of the results of Helsinki,"² General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev said in a PRAVDA interview.

The Warsaw Pact countries are countering NATO's dangerous policy line with a broad program of action to eliminate the threat of the cold war's rebirth, strengthen trust and mutual understanding in international relations and redirect the course of events into healthy and peaceful channels.

The anniversary meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact states, held in Warsaw on 14 and 15 May 1980, made a sizeable and highly timely contribution to the struggle for European security. The quarter of a century that has elapsed since the time the Warsaw Pact was signed has demonstrated that this multilateral alliance of socialist states is the most important factor of peace in Europe and the rest of the world. It is reliably guarding the socialist gains of its members and effectively serving the interests of peaceful cooperation. The declaration adopted at the May conference of the PCC, which sets forth this program of action in detail, has aroused great interest in the European capitals and on other continents.

Various foreign circles have naturally responded in different ways to the proposals set forth in the declaration. However, even the greatest skeptics in the West--with the exception, naturally, of the NATO militarists and Beijing hegemonists, who are completely devoid of common sense--have to admit that the Warsaw Pact states seriously intend to protect the peace in Europe and that the significance of the declaration's program of action will be lasting, and not temporary. In addition to favorable responses, and it must be said that these constitute the majority, there have also been attempts to belittle the significance of the results of the Warsaw conference. An issue of NEWSWEEK which came out after the Warsaw conference stated, for example, that the position taken by the USSR and the socialist countries supposedly "leaves no room for discussion and excludes the possibility of egalitarian negotiations."³ This is an example of inveterate falsification.

The spirit of the declaration is permeated with the desire for dialog and the search for mutually acceptable ways of establishing and intensifying friendly cooperation by all European states. The document stresses that "the present political, economic, scientific, technical and other peaceful contacts between states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe must not decrease, but must be further developed so that the exchange of opinions, ideas and beliefs regarding current European and world issues will continue within the framework of political contacts and consultations."⁴

An optimistic assessment of the prospects of the coming Madrid conference of states participating in the all-Europe conference was heard in Warsaw. The declaration stressed that the Madrid conference could conclude with agreement on practical steps regarding the military and political aspects of European security and the development of cooperation in all areas. "The Soviet Union," L. I. Brezhnev stressed, "is prepared to make a fitting contribution to the work"⁵ of this forum.

Soviet foreign policy has consistently and sincerely advocated that all international questions be settled by means of honest and egalitarian negotiations. The anniversary session of the PCC was followed by a meeting, also in Warsaw, between L. I. Brezhnev and President V. Giscard d'Estaing of the French Republic. Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko met in Vienna with U.S. Secretary of State E. Muskie and the foreign ministers of France, the FRG, Italy and England, who had gathered in the Austrian capital to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. On 17 May A. A. Gromyko met in Vienna with Federal Chancellor B. Kreisky of the Austrian Republic. In the summer, FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt visited Moscow, and Soviet leaders met with statesmen from other countries. The success of the Moscow Olympics demonstrated the futility of Washington circles' attempts to impede the development of universal international contacts.

A new initiative was born in Warsaw, dictated by the hope of strengthening peace in Europe as well as on other continents. The fraternal socialist countries proposed that heads of state from all parts of the world gather for a summit meeting in the near future. This meeting could focus attention on key international issues and define ways of eliminating sources of international tension and preventing war.

These and other facts testify that the USSR and all the states of the socialist community are firmly in favor of world peace and the normalization of conditions in Europe and other parts of the world. As L. I. Brezhnev stressed once again on 30 July 1980, "detente, cooperation and security--this is the general line of our party and the Soviet State in European affairs and in world politics in general."

II

The declaration of the May conference of the Warsaw Pact PCC stresses that "the problem of military detente and disarmament in Europe now occupies the central place among the problems on which the strengthening of peace on this continent will depend."

Military detente is a relatively new concept in the theory and practice of international relations. Just a few years ago, this was not a frequently used term in official documents, declarations by statesmen and politicians and the press. The struggle for military detente as one of the important ways of guaranteeing European security was quite definitely placed on the agenda of European politics by the Soviet Union and the fraternal countries of the socialist community. The idea was supported by broad segments of the public and responsible statesmen and politicians in the West, who were convinced of its importance in the security of their own nations and the entire continent as a whole.

On the theoretical and practical levels, military detente in Europe essentially means the consistent reduction and eventual eradication of military confrontation on the continent without disrupting the existing military balance between the two opposing military and political groups. On the one hand, it envisages concrete steps to reduce armed forces and arms. On the other, it includes steps to instill confidence. Besides this, it presupposes political and legal steps to strengthen the guaranteed security of states. The combination of all this should reduce the danger of a new war.

Military detente is dialectically related to political detente. These are two sides of a single process bringing intergovernmental relations in line with public desires and the hope of each normal person for a peaceful life, free of violence and the threat of war. By analogy with the well-known formula regarding the relationship between war and policy, we could say that military detente is an extension of political detente with its own distinctive means. Political detente comes first, preparing the soil for increasingly complex positive steps in the military sphere. Steps toward military detente would be unthinkable without progress in intergovernmental relations and without the creation of a climate of trust (and this is only made possible by intergovernmental agreements based on the principles of peaceful coexistence). Conversely, each successful step in the military sphere invariably strengthens the general process of detente.

What are the real ways of advancing the cause of military detente in Europe? The Warsaw Pact countries believe that the most important are the reinforcement and

expansion of trust, the renunciation of force and threats of force, the limitation of armed forces and arms to meet the needs of defense exclusively, and the mutual renunciation of attempts to achieve military superiority. We can firmly say that there are not, and cannot be, any insurmountable obstacles impeding the discovery of practical decisions in favor of military detente in Europe if all sides approach this matter with the desire to make a constructive contribution.

Examples of this approach can be seen in the policy of the USSR and its allies. As we know, in October 1979 the Soviet Union, by agreement with other Warsaw Pact countries, announced the unilateral withdrawal of a specific number of Soviet troops and weapons from Central Europe. The reports from Moscow that this withdrawal had been completed ahead of schedule--by 1 August 1980--aroused profound satisfaction abroad.⁶

Military and political detente will be stronger if material steps toward trust and disarmament are supplemented with legal steps to reduce the danger of war. This is the purpose of the Warsaw Pact countries' proposal that the participants in the all-Europe conference sign a treaty on no first use of nuclear and conventional weapons against one another.

The position of the fraternal socialist countries is effective and realistic for our nuclear age because it is aimed at guaranteeing equal security for all states, big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. The Warsaw conference firmly and clearly announced the need to take special steps to strengthen the guaranteed security of non-nuclear European states. These steps could envisage that the nuclear powers will never use nuclear weapons against European states--regardless of their membership or non-membership in military alliances--which do not possess these weapons and do not have foreign nuclear weapons within their territory. These states have the right to expect a guarantee that no other type of weapon will be used against them either, in accordance with the principle of the renunciation of the use of force and threats of force.

The conclusion of practical agreements at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe could play an important part in diminishing military confrontation on the European continent and promoting military detente. The Vienna talks have been going on for almost 7 years, but have had no practical results as yet. The main reason is the unconstructive and overtly obstructionist position of the NATO countries, which are still trying to use the talks to obtain unilateral military advantages at the expense of the legitimate security interests of the socialist states.

The anniversary meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC ascertained that the "NATO countries are not contributing to the success of the matter, and their position on the issues being discussed has even regressed recently." The Western countries are insisting on a so-called "asymmetrical"--that is, unequal--reduction of the ground forces of both sides. What is more, in their proposals of 27 December 1979, they completely excluded the FRG, England and other Western European countries, which account for more than three-fourths of the contingent of NATO personnel in Central Europe, from the process of armed forces reduction.

It is obvious that these terms cannot be accepted by any state concerned with safeguarding its own security.

Assessing the atmosphere at the Vienna talks and their prospects, the Warsaw Pact states declared at the PCC conference that they consider the continued delays in the talks on the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe to be completely unacceptable. In their opinion, "the possibilities for reaching agreement at the Vienna talks are far from exhausted. They are prepared to continue their efforts to find solutions which, without threatening the security of any side, will lower the level of military confrontation in Central Europe. This will require that all participants in the Vienna talks take a constructive approach to the matter."

It is this approach that the socialist countries demonstrated when they advanced new proposals at the 243d plenary session of the Vienna talks in July 1980. They could perceptibly stimulate the elaboration of mutually acceptable decisions. According to this new initiative, during the first stage the troops of the USSR and the United States in Central Europe should be reduced, respectively, by 20,000 and 13,000 individuals. And this does not include the 20,000 Soviet servicemen who were withdrawn from the GDR on a unilateral basis. Now the West must respond to this constructive initiative.

The Warsaw declaration proposes, as an act of collective goodwill, an agreement that, as of a specific agreed upon date, no state or groups of states in Europe will increase the size of its armed forces in the region specified in the Final Act of the all-European conference.

The socialist states have consistently advocated steps toward military detente in every part of Europe and in the Mediterranean. In their opinion, the steps in the Mediterranean could include the extension of confidence-instilling measures to this zone, the reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of naval ships carrying nuclear weapons, and the refusal to deploy nuclear weapons within Mediterranean European and non-European non-nuclear countries. The Warsaw Pact states, the declaration stresses, are prepared for serious and businesslike talks on all these matters.

III

The countries of the socialist community attach special significance to the major question of how a further race for nuclear arms in Europe can be avoided.

Even before the North Atlantic bloc made the decision to deploy new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe, the socialist countries were warning nations, governments, the public and all concerned of the dangerous consequences of carrying out these militaristic plans, the purpose of which was to disrupt the existing balance of forces in Europe and use the strategic situation on the continent in NATO's favor. These plans are based on reliance on force as the chief means of conducting imperialist policy. If these plans are carried out, they will not only destabilize relations between the United States and the USSR but will also lead to general instability in the world. At a meeting in the beginning of December 1979, the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states announced that "the decision to produce new types of American medium-range nuclear missiles and to deploy them in Western Europe and the implementation of this decision would destroy the basis of negotiations. This would mean an attempt by NATO to negotiate from a position of strength, which is fundamentally unacceptable to the Warsaw Pact states. The governments of the NATO countries must be aware of this."⁷

Militaristic NATO circles did not listen to these intelligent proposals, staking, as they say, their all in this move. On 12 December 1979 the NATO Council, meeting in Brussels, decided to deploy around 600 new American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe.⁸ The NATO decision represents serious escalation of the arms race both by virtue of the new features of this American weapon (its size, accuracy and ability to elude means of detection and control) and by virtue of the new element it introduces into the European strategic situation. For the first time since the evacuation of American medium-range Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey in the second half of the 1960's, NATO will have nuclear missiles capable of reaching Soviet territory. In 1982 and 1983, when the deployment of the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles is supposed to be completed, a new weapon, capable of performing the strategic functions of nuclear missile aggression against the USSR and the socialist countries, will be added to other American weapons aimed at the Soviet Union--the land-based Minuteman ICBM, the Polaris submarine and the B-52 bomber.

The deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe and other Pentagon steps to augment the "forward-basing" systems (carrier- and land-based fighter planes and ballistic missiles or submarines sailing the seas around Europe) aimed at the USSR are being camouflaged by a propagandistic commotion, during the course of which the reciprocal steps the Soviet Union has had to take to strengthen its own security are being passed off as the notorious "Soviet military threat." The Soviet Union is being accused of "disrupting the balance" with its SS-20 missiles

Actually, this missile, which has been gradually deployed in recent years as a response to U.S. and NATO "forward-basing systems," represents an improved model of existing missiles and has the same range. The deployment of SS-20 missiles was no secret at the time of the talks on the SALT II treaty, signed by the USSR and the United States in Vienna in June 1979, based on mutual acknowledgement of parity and reinforcing this parity.

"As the chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR," said L. I. Brezhnev in his Berlin speech on 6 October 1979, "I can definitely say that the quantity of carriers of medium-range nuclear weapons has not been increased by a single missile or a single plane in the European part of the Soviet Union in the last 10 years. To the contrary, the quantity of medium-range missile launching sites and the nuclear intensity of these missiles have even been reduced somewhat. The quantity of medium bombers has also decreased. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is not deploying such devices in other states at all."⁹

Now that the United States has won a chance to deploy its medium-range nuclear missiles on the European continent, it is urging England, the FRG, France and some other NATO states to carry out the plans for the so-called "Eurostrategic balance." Washington hopes to use the "Eurobalance" to direct the development of the European military and political situation even more sharply in its own favor.

In the past, Washington officials maintain, when the United States held the strategic advantage, there was the possibility of allocating part of the American potential as a balance for Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in the "European theater." Now, they allege, under the conditions of Soviet-U.S. strategic parity, it is impossible to accomplish "long-distance containment"--that is, to guarantee

U.S. nuclear protection of the European allies. The Soviet arsenal of medium-range missiles is supposedly not balanced by corresponding forces on the Western side, and the Western European states are virtually defenseless in the face of the "Soviet threat." The deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, they are implying to the Western Europeans, will help the matter, but even this will not be enough. The European NATO countries must give some consideration to their own means of opposing this "threat." They have asserted that "there can be no real equilibrium between Soviet and Western Eurostrategic capabilities" and that "an imbalance in favor of the USSR, and not a balance, will also be characteristic of the Eurostrategic situation."¹⁰ The creation of new nuclear missile potential, parallel to the American potential, is on the NATO agenda.

In this way, Western Europe is taking on the new role of a bridgehead for the American strategy of total nuclear war. If circles within the U.S. military-industrial complex decide to make a senseless aggressive move, the American missiles launched from Europe could produce the first explosions in a worldwide atomic conflict. After all, in any synchronized launching of the U.S. missiles in Europe, as well as Minutemen, Polarines and B-52's from the bridgeheads assigned to them by strategy and technical capability, the Pershing-2 will have the shortest trip to make. In general, it is obvious that the Carter Administration's strategic doctrine places the highest hopes in the European missile bridgehead. The so-called "new nuclear strategy" approved by the President in July 1980 in the form of Directive No 39 is essentially supposed to make the very idea of nuclear war more acceptable to public opinion.

When Pentagon chief H. Brown spoke in Newport on 21 August (this speech is considered to be the official announcement of the new military doctrine), he alleged that Directive No 39 did not signify any radical departure from U.S. military strategy of the last decade. His explanation of the essence of the Directive, however, demonstrated quite unequivocally that emphasis would be placed on the possibility of delivering a "preventive" nuclear strike to win a nuclear war. The Pentagon has proclaimed the goal of destroying the military, especially the nuclear, strength of the enemy to stop the enemy from responding with a devastating strike at U.S. territory or to at least minimize enemy capacity for retaliation. To carry out these strategic plans, the U.S. military leadership is advocating the development of new nuclear missiles which will be more destructive and more accurate than existing offensive weapon systems. According to Pentagon calculations, the Trident system and the American medium-range missiles deployed in Western Europe could serve this purpose.

In short, these new plans sound very much like the plans for preventive war. Indeed, any power which resolves to destroy the military strength of the enemy must be the first to use a weapon; otherwise, its nuclear charges will rain down on empty launching sites and airfields. It must forestall the enemy and accomplish a surprise attack to put the enemy's nuclear missiles, aircraft and other military hardware out of commission before they can be used for self-defense and for retaliation.¹¹

The deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe is connected with more than just the Pentagon's plans to use them as the leading instruments of aggression.

It is obvious that an attempt is being made to divert the danger of a retaliatory nuclear strike away from overseas territories by transferring most of it to

Western Europe. The hostage role to which the Western European partners have been doomed since the time of NATO's founding is becoming even more apparent. The policy in which the United States is striving to involve its European partners is contrary to the national interests of the people, civilization, culture and future of this continent.

The NATO states which have agreed to the American medium-range missiles will acquire nothing tangible for their own security, but they will complicate their own political and strategic position. As T. Sommer, chief editor of West Germany's DIE ZEIT newspaper, remarked in an article printed in the European edition of NEWSWEEK, the deployment of the new nuclear weapon will lead to a situation in which "the European NATO partners will have to carry the heavy burden of atomic weapons which will make them more vulnerable but will not strengthen U.S. nuclear guarantees."¹²

The American medium-range missiles in Europe are made to order for the Pentagon officials who speak of the possibility of keeping a nuclear conflict within controlled and safe (for the United States, of course) limits, of the possibility of separating, so to speak, the doctrine of nuclear war from the concept of total war.

Pentagon strategists would apparently be most pleased with the model constructed by General J. Hackett in his book "The Third World War": the limitation of a conflict to an exchange of nuclear strikes at European cities, with American cities and the rest of the United States outside the bounds of the conflict.¹³

The idea of regulating a nuclear conflict--either by means of compiling a "code of behavior" for the warring sides or by means of special new weapon systems--has long aroused the interest of theoreticians working on U.S. military policy and officials from the Pentagon and other Washington agencies.¹⁴ All attempts have quickly proved to be unrealistic. This applies completely to the Pentagon's latest strategic innovation. In fact, even Washington officials are not concealing their skepticism regarding the possibility of dividing targets into military and civilian and excluding the latter from the sphere of reciprocal nuclear strikes. President Carter and his closest advisers have admitted that if a nuclear conflict should break out, it will encompass all targets without exception. "Various suggestions have been made about how the sides can emerge from a nuclear war with the least damage to their industry and the least human losses," Senator G. McGovern stated, "but no one can deny that these losses will be measured in hundreds of millions of human lives and that our society and economy, even if we should 'win' this war, will suffer tremendous injuries."¹⁵

In spite of this skepticism, the elaboration of dangerous plans and the establishment of a material and technical base for carrying out the Pentagon's strategic plans, including the plan to employ American missiles in Western Europe, are going on at full speed.

The Warsaw Pact policy line is in sharp contrast to these plans. The declaration of the anniversary conference of the PCC of the fraternal socialist countries firmly stated that they "have never aspired, and will never aspire, to military supremacy. They have never had, do not now have, and will never have any strategic doctrine but a defensive one, and they have never had, do not now have, and never will have any intention of creating first-nuclear-strike potential!"

The efforts of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states to find ways of reaching an agreement to prevent a new round in the race for nuclear arms in Europe are particularly important under the present conditions of international complications. We can confidently say that if all states are guided by the interests of the peace and security of the European people and display the necessary political will, the preservation of the existing approximate power equilibrium, the presence of which was just recently acknowledged by the NATO countries, will be accompanied by the prevention of the further dangerous escalation of the nuclear arms race in Europe and the discovery of ways of maintaining this equilibrium at lower levels.

As we know, during the Soviet-West German summit meeting in Moscow in summer 1980, the Soviet side made new suggestions regarding talks on nuclear weapons in Europe. It was proposed that questions pertaining to medium-range nuclear missiles and those pertaining to existing American forward-basing nuclear systems be discussed at the same time and as an organic unit. Talks of this kind could begin even before the ratification of the SALT II treaty, but any agreement reached at these talks would have to be implemented after the treaty goes into effect.

This sounds absolutely correct to many people abroad, including statesmen in a number of Western countries. Naturally, the Soviet Union cannot and will not ignore the fact that large quantities of American nuclear weapons are concentrated in Europe and close to its borders. No one will allow the United States and NATO to take unilateral advantages--after all, any dialog must be based on the principle of equality, equivalent security and the observance of the overall military and strategic balance between the USSR and the United States. After FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt returned from Moscow, he spoke more than once in support of the new Soviet proposals. Politicians in other Western states have said that the Soviet initiative will provide an excellent opportunity to find a mutually acceptable solution to one of the most urgent problems of our time. As for Washington, nothing definite has been said about this in the American capital to date.

The European people have a vital interest in immediate and successful talks on nuclear missiles in Europe and in the liquidation of nuclear missile stockpiles on the European continent. This will be in the interests of the peace and security of all people.

Two approaches to the problem of military detente in Europe are evident. The NATO policy line will seriously endanger the security of the continent. The Warsaw Pact line, on the contrary, is aimed at preserving and strengthening detente and consolidating trust between European peoples and states. The implementation of the suggestions to convene a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe, proposed by the Warsaw Pact states at the May PCC conference, could become an important step in this direction. These states feel that the decision to convene this conference could be made at the Madrid meeting.

For their part, the Warsaw Pact states are prepared to give careful consideration to the proposals of other states regarding the conference agenda and procedures. An extremely suitable place for the conference has even been found: the Polish People's Republic has proposed that the conference be held in Warsaw--a city which displayed the greatest heroism and self-sacrifice during the years of the severe hardships of World War II.

Socialist foreign policy has always been distinguished by clear and honest language and the frank statement of intentions. The Warsaw Pact states are not concealing the fact that they will take all necessary steps to keep their defense capability on the appropriate level as long as the NATO bloc exists and as long as it continues to build up its military potential in an attempt to achieve military supremacy. They will always be concerned about the need to provide their people with reliable security.

Stressing this, the fraternal socialist countries have clearly stated that the bloc policy is organically alien to them. They have made numerous announcements of their willingness to dissolve their alliance if the NATO bloc should be liquidated at the same time and have proposed the liquidation of the military organizations of both groups as a first step, beginning with the mutual reduction of military activity. These proposals are still valid. Ever since the Warsaw Pact was concluded, it has been the policy of its members to overcome the partition of Europe into military and political groups, reduce the distance between them and strengthen trust in relations between all European states, and not to expand both alliances and extend their influence to new regions.

The states of the North Atlantic bloc cannot profess this kind of open and constructive position, backed up by the willingness to take practical steps in all of the directions listed above.

Historical optimism is the philosophy of the people of the Soviet Union and all of the fraternal countries of the socialist community. They are confident that their friendship and solidarity and their development of cooperation with all peace-loving states and broad social forces will lead to new successes in the struggle against the threat of war and will make the 1980's years of peace and peaceful construction. As the June (1980) CPSU Central Committee Plenum stressed, "detente is now deeply rooted in international life, and tangible prerequisites exist for its preservation as the dominant trend in world politics."¹⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. Renowned American historian R. Steel, author of "Pax Americana" and "End of Alliance," made the following comment: "After 3 years of the Carter Administration, relations with the Russians have reached a stage of crisis, we have embarked on the grand-scale escalation of the arms race, we have lost the trust of our closest allies and we are no longer taken seriously by the developing countries.... Carter took office as a great savior but he is ending his term as a crusader marching to his own drummer" (NEWSDAY, 6 April 1980).
2. PRAVDA, 30 July 1980.
3. NEWSWEEK, 2 June 1980.
4. PRAVDA, 16 May 1980.
5. Ibid., 30 July 1980.
6. In accordance with this decision, 20,000 Soviet servicemen, a thousand tanks and other military equipment were withdrawn from the territory of the GDR.

In order to continue instilling confidence, the USSR has expressed its willingness to agree on the advance announcement of large-scale military exercises by ground troops involving not 25,000 individuals or more, as envisaged in the Final Act, but, for example, 20,000. The Soviet Union is prepared to not conduct military exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000 individuals if this agreement is mutual.

7. PRAVDA, 6 December 1979.
8. For more detail, see V. S. Shein, "Behind the Facade of Nuclear 'Modernization,'" SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1980--Editor's note.
9. PRAVDA, 7 October 1979.
10. "The Future of Arms Control," ADELPHI PAPERS, No 141 (London), 1978, pp 27-28.
11. The plans for preventive war are part of the tradition of American military-political thinking. Even if we do not consider the late 1940's, when the idea of the blitzkrieg was the basis of all U.S. military plans, reliance on first-strike potential has been an essential element of all subsequent Pentagon theories right up to the very latest. At a theoretical conference of communist and workers parties in Sofia in December 1978, Secretary General G. Hall of the Communist Party, USA, said that, "without any kind of publicity, the Pentagon is feverishly working on pre-emptive nuclear strategic forces." The same kind of warnings have been voiced by some bourgeois Americans who are apprehensive about the risky nature of the Pentagon's military plans.
12. NEWSWEEK, 26 November 1979, p 27.
13. J. Hackett et al, "The Third World War," London, 1979, pp 367, 391. This kind of reasoning is popular in American circles; it is not surprising that Hackett's book was on the U.S. best-seller list throughout 1979 and 1980.
14. The first attempts at the theoretical regulation of nuclear war were made by H. Kissinger in his 1957 book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," where he set forth the rules governing "minor atomic wars." In his next book, "Necessity for Choice" (1961), however, Kissinger admitted the need to limit atomic conflict and was already discussing limited warfare with conventional weapons. Many theories regarding the limitation of the risk of nuclear war for America were set forth in the 1960's and 1970's. H. Kahn's "Thinking About the Unthinkable"--the "escalation doctrine"--was the most famous of these, but it was an equally futile attempt to theoretically substantiate the possibility of preserving the doctrine of total war as an instrument of U.S. policy.
15. ATLANTIC, June 1980, p 48.
16. PRAVDA, 24 June 1980.

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TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 15-28

[Article by V. M. Kudrov]

[Text] The American economy entered the 1980's with a heavy load of exceedingly acute problems and contradictions. Its characteristics in the 1970's were intense inflation, an energy crisis, a dollar crisis and a sharp decline in production efficiency. The nation experienced two overproduction crises, it became twice as dependent on imported oil, the prices of consumer goods and services doubled, the dollar lost one-third its value, the deficit in the balance of trade became gigantic and the growth of labor productivity in the national economy fell to half the level of the 1960's.

To a considerable extent, all of this was indissolubly connected with the dynamics of research and development expenditures and the declining rate of technological progress in the 1970's. On the one hand, technological progress leads to the depreciation of fixed capital and technology based on previous technical principles, to the mass obsolescence of traditional technical equipment and to the objective need to replace it with new equipment of a higher level. On the other hand, technological progress presupposes changes in the previous production structure and the creation of a new structure. The development of production and technology and the formation of this production structure are complex and interdependent processes. The crisis phase of the cycle in this development, in which the U.S. economy found itself, for example, in 1980, results in the partial destruction of productive forces but also performs an important stimulating, constructive function precisely due to this destruction . . . id.

Some Trends in the Sphere of Research and Development

Between 1968 and 1975 expenditures on research and development in the United States decreased approximately 8 percent, or around 1 percent a year.¹ This was largely connected with cuts in federal appropriations and primarily affected expenditures on research. Expenditures on research and engineering in the private sector, on the other hand, as well as expenditures on development, stayed virtually the same. According to the American press, fundamental university science and applied research in government laboratories suffered the most during this period, and this injured technological progress, the economy and the position of the United States in the world. The decrease in research expenditures mainly affected military and space projects. It would seem that the main reason for the decreased expenditures

on research and development was the objective need for their structural reorganization in the direction of the intensification of research and its closer coordination with specific production and social objectives.

At that same time, the U.S. share of the world index of references in scientific literature declined, the number of patents registered annually by Americans in their own country decreased, and the rates of product renovation and innovation slowed down. The U.S. share of world technical innovation began to decrease as early as the beginning of the 1960's, when expenditures on research and development were rising at the quickest rate. According to the estimates of experts from the National Science Foundation (NSF), at the end of the 1950's the United States accounted for 82 percent of the major technical innovations in the leading capitalist countries between 1953 and 1973, but by the mid-1960's the figure was only 55 percent.²

In connection with this, a law was passed in 1976 on the organization and priorities of U.S. scientific and technical policy, stating that the United States should "constantly increase national investments in science, engineering and technology, commensurate with national demand and the requirements of the economic situation."³ By the first half of the 1970's, unprofitable and unimportant areas of research and development were already being abandoned, plans for scientific and engineering work were being revised to heighten their commercial impact and bring them in line with changing priorities in productive fields, and scientists and engineers who had not displayed enough scientific flexibility and creativity were being dismissed. Government agencies, private firms and universities began to lay special stress on the employment of talented individuals, on the conservation of resources and time, on the closer coordination of science with production and on projects fitting into the framework of a comprehensive program. All of this constitutes the so-called rational approach, about which so much has been written and said in the West and which is aimed at heightening the effectiveness of scientific activity.

The main instrument for attaining this goal is improvement in the management and organization of research and development and the institution of special-program financing within the bounds of science-production complexes. As an OECD report pointed out, "the management of research and development must now be aimed more at the better use of extremely limited or slowly growing resources. In the future, research and development should be adapted more to the needs of companies and should be more innovative." The authors of this report state that, in principle, "scientific research laboratories should become profit centers, responsible for their discoveries up to the point when the new item becomes commercial." They also stress, however, that crude administrative methods of organizing research have been unsuccessful and have given rise to new difficulties.

Increasing significance is being attached to stronger government stimulation of research and development and technological progress. It is important to the United States not only from the standpoint of the general interests of American imperialism and the desire to recover the positions the United States has lost in the world, to heighten the competitive potential of commodities and to keep the leading role in technological progress, but also from the standpoint of the objectives of anti-crisis and anticyclical policy. This policy envisages, in particular, the stimulation of production areas requiring high scientific input, which are less vulnerable to a crisis, the renewal of fixed capital and the acceleration of innovations for

the purpose of expanding demand, improving market conditions and putting new high-quality goods with relatively low prices on the market.

Direct government support of new commercial projects in industry--that is, the process of innovation as long practiced in Western Europe--is uncommon in the United States (with the exception of the support of research in the small business sector). It is here, however, that radical changes are now taking place. In April 1978, the structure of the U.S. administrative establishment began to be revised, affecting the operations of government bodies responsible for technological progress. Since that time, work has been performed to institute a policy of government stimulation of innovations in U.S. industry. In a special message to the Congress on this matter on 21 October 1979, Carter spoke of the need to "strengthen the nation's competitive ability" and spirit of enterprise for decades in advance.⁴ This program contains the following nine points: stimulation of the dissemination of technical information; its accumulation; improvement of the patent system; clarification of antitrust policy; stimulation of the development of small firms incorporating scientific and technical discoveries; improvement of the federal purchasing system; improvement of the regulation system; guaranteed adaptation of workers and administrators to technological progress; maintenance of a favorable climate for technical progress.

In the second half of the 1970's, after the completion of a comprehensive reorganization, total expenditures on research and development in the United States began to rise moderately but at a fairly steady rate--an average of 3.5 percent annually in 1975-1979. At present (1980), expenditures on research and development exceed 57 billion dollars. Their increase in real terms in 1980 is 2 percent.⁵

What is more, real expenditures on fundamental and applied research, making up more than one-third of all these expenditures, have also begun to rise, primarily as a result of increased government appropriations. The average annual rate of increase in these expenditures was 3.7 percent in real terms in 1975-1979, exceeding the average rate of increase in all research and development (3.5 percent). In 1979, however, expenditures on fundamental research exceeded the 1968 level by only 4 percent, while the figure for expenditures on applied research was 20 percent.⁶ More significance was attached to projects capable of producing the quickest, short-term economic or social impact, often with no regard for the long-range impact. On the whole, federal allocations for research and development in 1975-1979 rose 10 percent, and private allocations rose 19 percent.⁷

The structure of research and development expenditures has now become stabilized in the following proportions: 13 percent for fundamental research, 22 percent for applied research and 65 percent for development. This high percentage of expenditures on experimental design and development testifies to the extremely serious attention being given to questions connected with the incorporation of research findings and the development of a strong design and experimental base. More than 72 percent of all research and development expenditures are made in industry, 13 percent in government science centers and 12 percent in universities (the research centers of non-profit organizations account for the rest).⁸

The budget message of the American President of 28 January 1980 states the following: "In the final analysis, economic growth depends to a definite extent on technical progress. For many years our nation was the world leader in the

development of new technical equipment. Now we face the danger of losing this leading position. The draft budget for 1981 reaffirms my earlier promise to put an end to the tendencies that have been taking shape in the last two decades and envisages a considerable and constant increase in appropriations--at a rate staying ahead of inflation--for research and development programs. Bond issues to finance research and development will be increased by 13 percent, and those connected with fundamental research projects will increase by 12 percent" (in current prices).⁹ It would be difficult to say at this point whether research and development expenditures in 1981 will rise in real terms (calculated with consideration for the increase in prices over the year). One thing is clear: Inflation could "absorb" the planned increase.

The research and development budget for fiscal year 1981 is distinguished by higher proportional expenditures on fundamental research, as well as on military and space research projects. Defense Department expenditures will increase 21 percent, and the respective figures for the NSF and NASA will be 17 percent and 11.3 percent (in current prices).¹⁰ This will be accompanied by lower proportional federal expenditures on energy research (the expected increase is only 7.6 percent), largely as a result of the cancellation of projects connected with fast-neutron reactors. There will be cuts in expenditures on the construction of research centers, the purchase of equipment and the establishment of model power engineering facilities.¹¹ According to the latest reports, U.S. industrial firms faced by stronger foreign competition and the need to solve energy and ecological problems, must increase their expenditures on fundamental research.¹²

Therefore, the present production decline is not being accompanied by cuts in research and development expenditures. The effectiveness of these expenditures, however, is decreasing. This is clearly reflected in the slower growth of labor productivity, in the decreasing competitive potential of American commodities, which has been apparent for 15 years now, the increased percentage of foreign goods in the domestic market and the declining level of innovation.

The considerably lower levels of innovation resulting from inflation, the shortage of capital investments, the obsolescence of laboratory equipment and other factors are considered to be no secret in the United States. The former vice president of the Radio Corporation of America, J. Hiller, stated: "If you had invested in standard innovations in, say, the mid-1960's, you could have expected to recoup and reinvest your funds within 7-9 years. It now takes 14-15 years to recoup the capital spent on precisely the same kind of innovation. This means that we must use twice as much capital (in constant prices) ... to have the same number of innovations today as we did 15 years ago."¹³

The declining effectiveness of research and development expenditures in the United States is connected with the exhaustion of the possibilities of the old technical principles on which the current production system and technology are based. This tendency can only be changed if the research and development sphere is radically reorganized and if national production makes the transition to the new technical principles, and this is directly related to the development of fundamental research.

Within the context of the latest trends in the research and development sphere, it would be expedient to consider the organizational and economic workings of the sphere of research activity in the United States, which is distinguished by

decentralization. Any changes here are more likely to reinforce, and not undermine, this principle. According to American experts, decentralization has negative and positive features. On the one hand, it leads to the duplication of research projects, their weaker coordination, and the dissipation of efforts and resources. On the other, it stimulates activity and interest in researchers and developers, contributes to the mobility of scientists and allows them to reveal their creative potential more fully, reduces the danger of bureaucratization and encourages a spirit of independence and responsibility. According to these experts, the positive features ultimately prevail.

American experts admit that the fundamental knowledge accumulated in the United States far exceeds the level of its practical implementation in engineering and industry. At the same time, much of this knowledge is obsolete, it must be replaced by fundamentally new information and it requires the modification of paradigms in various fields of research activity. This is why the United States must now deal with the major problem of moving on to a new level of theoretical knowledge and the radical updating of accumulated fundamental research findings.

Lending Areas of Technological Progress

The structure of research and development expenditures discussed above has a direct effect on the determination of areas of technological progress, on the structure of capital investments and, through these, on the structure of production. Science and production in the United States are now more organically interconnected, even though they have retained a certain degree of organizational and economic independence; science gives strong impetus to production development. As President P. Handler of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences once said, "our economy is based more on minds, on the use of scientific knowledge, than on natural resources."¹⁴ Technical innovations not only ultimately necessitate changes in areas of technological and economic development, but also bring about definite changes in the social and political life of a nation, affecting the way of life, the environment and the balance of power between capitalist countries.

The following were the leading areas of technological progress in the United States in the second half of the 1970's and will most likely remain prominent in the 1980's.

1. The development of new types of technical equipment, particularly automated, for various branches of the economy. The proportion accounted for by automated means of production and control in total purchases of new equipment rose from 20 percent in the mid-1960's to 30 percent in 1973 and 39 percent in 1976.¹⁵ Computer, robot and microprocessor research and production are developing particularly rapidly. Despite the general rise in prices, the prices of many of these items are dropping. The development of new types of equipment is leading to the further industrialization of various spheres of the economy and public life (for example, housework, recreation, public health, trade, science and administration). This process is most apparent in physical production, where more and more new machines are replacing the manual labor that is still used in some branches, as well as old equipment. Whereas industrialization is of a primary nature in the first case, in the second it is secondary, tertiary and so forth.

In branches of machine building and metal processing, distinguished by large-scale and mass production, computer-operated automatic flowlines are being used more widely. In branches of machine building with small-series production, modern, highly productive, multi-operational and multi-instrument machine tools, equipped with programmed control using microelectronic integral systems, are being used on an increasingly broad scale. These tools are called "processing centers." In both cases the latest automated equipment is replacing obsolete equipment.

Research into the development of equipment to considerably heighten the effectiveness of technological processes is expanding (laser equipment, equipment for joining metals, cold pressing, the thermal cleaning of metallic surfaces and the pouring of inoculated cast iron and electrical powdered surfaces, etc.). The technology of metal processing is changing; cutting, forging and pressing equipment is being used less. Such new methods of metal processing are being introduced as electroerosion, electron-ion-beam, laser, plasma, chemical, electrochemical and electrosonic; shaping is now being accomplished by means of magnetic impulse processes, explosions and so forth.

2. Research and development in the United States are now aimed at the creation of more complexes or systems of machines than separate machines. These systems are already being used in agriculture, construction, mining, the automation of warehousing operations, the transport of freight and so forth.

The move toward systems of machines is objectively necessary because the development of production specialization complicates economic ties and heightens the interdependence and mutually supplementary nature of various types of technological equipment in a single production chain. Systems of machinery can prevent "gaps" in the mechanization chain, guarantee an uninterrupted production process, provide for the more efficient use of production resources and replace obsolete separate pieces of equipment.

3. Much of America's scientific potential is now focused on the development of equipment and technology which will conserve energy and raw materials, and the investigation of new energy sources. The proportion accounted for in total research expenditures by projects in the energy field has constantly risen in recent years. Between 1973 and 1978, just the federal allocations for these projects rose almost 5.3-fold and amounted to more than 3 billion dollars.¹⁶ In 1979 the research and development expenditures of industrial companies in the area of energy-conserving technology rose 24.1 percent. In 1978 these expenditures totaled 5.1 billion dollars, and in 1979 they rose to 6.3 billion. According to estimates, they will reach 8.8 billion by 1982. At that time the first place will be held by transport machine building, and the second and third will be held by the aerospace and petroleum refining industries.¹⁷

The development of small-scale, miniature equipment and the reduction of the weight of machinery per unit of capacity constitute an important area of research aimed at more economical production and lower material requirements. Despite the general decline in production, there has been a great deal of activity in the United States in the production and sale of mini-computers, office computers, household computers and microprocessors.

A great deal of attention is being given to the development of fundamentally new types of heat-, pressure- and corrosion-resistant crude resources and materials.

According to estimates, the federal budget alone allocates at least 1 billion dollars each year for research and development projects involving new materials.¹⁸ Even so, crude resources are in short supply, and the United States must spend considerable funds and effort to investigate the possibility of using secondary resources and production and consumption waste, which are accumulating in huge quantities. The nation's economy is now strongly dependent on recycled raw materials. Suffice it to say that approximately half of all copper, 50 percent of all lead, 20-25 percent of all aluminum and more than 20 percent of all paper are derived from scrap (the latter saves 200 million trees a year). What is more, special plants are being built to use secondary resources. In 1977 there were already 15 plants for the use of waste products, and another 20 were being designed and built.

In addition to major innovations based on discoveries and inventions which change existing technical principles, the huge quantity of minor improvements and modernizations within the framework of previous principles is constantly growing. The economic impact of these is quite sizeable. As one study pointed out, "the cumulative effect of minor technical changes to reduce production costs is actually much greater than the effect of major technical changes."¹⁹

4. The United States must spend a great deal of effort and resources on research and development in the area of environmental protection. According to estimates, these private and government expenditures now exceed 1 billion dollars a year (1978), or at least 2 percent of all research and development expenditures in the nation. Of this total sum, industry as a whole spends 3 percent of its research and development expenditures for these purposes, and the chemical industry spends 13.5 percent.²⁰ Sizeable amounts are allocated by the government. Total expenditures on environmental protection in 1979 were around 50 billion dollars.

The current guidelines in the development of science, technology and production in the United States are posing a number of traditionally, seemingly long-solved problems in a new way. In particular, this applies to the effectiveness of mass-scale specialized production and small-scale production. At a time of highly fluctuating demand and an insistence on items of high quality, mass-scale standardized production is often inefficient, inflexible and prematurely obsolete. Non-mass production, aimed at a specific consumer and the flexible modification of product assortment and product quality under the influence of demand, is now considered preferable. According to the AMERICAN MACHINIST: "Today consumer demand is directed at high-quality products, often in small quantities which make their mass production simply inexpedient.... Even the automotive industry, which gave the world the assembly line and even the word 'automation,' is now more concerned with high-quality production than 'mass production.'"²¹

Small enterprises, which are more adaptable to changing external conditions, are often distinguished by higher productivity and effectiveness. But the role of small business in the process of innovation is particularly important.²²

These areas of technological progress do not indicate the widespread use of the latest scientific and technical achievements in American production. Life is much more complex, and their wider use has been accompanied by the retention of sizeable enclaves using old equipment and obsolete technology.

Structural Changes in Production

Expenditures on research and development and technological progress influence the structure of the economy. Consequently, they are connected to a considerable extent with the crisis in the structure of U.S. reproduction in the 1970's. This influence is not only exerted through capital investments, but also through the parameters of new equipment and new technology and the rising requirements of the economy and the entire society. Before the structure of production could change, the United States had to begin changing the structure of research and development expenditures and the structure and organization of the entire sphere of scientific activity in the nation

Experience showed that many old technical and organizational production methods were economically unsound under the new conditions. In particular, they could not prevent the pollution of the environment or alleviate difficulties connected with the mounting shortage of raw materials, particularly fuel and energy sources. Fundamental research did not bring about the necessary transition to new production principles based on major and fundamentally new inventions and discoveries. Major problems in social development and the need to enhance the "quality of life" have not been solved either. In connection with this, the United States must pay increased attention to the qualitative side of production, institute a new technical order and comprehensively coordinate the enlargement of facilities and the establishment of new industries and production units with the resolution of many pressing socioeconomic problems. Naturally, technological progress is not the only factor involved in structural reorganization. There are also others (prices, production costs, militarization and so forth), which we will not be discussing.

In recent years the existing production system has ceased to correspond to the narrowing possibilities for supplying the nation with raw materials. In turn, the technological and economic capabilities of the existing technical order ceased to correspond to rising public requirements, and market demand began to place more insistence on highly technical products of the best quality, requiring high scientific input. The policy of intensive economic growth, conducted up to the beginning of the 1970's, was largely based on the low cost (in comparison to the prices of finished items) and accessibility of raw material and energy resources imported from the developing countries. Now the era of cheap raw material is in the past, and the present or previously developed economic structure has ceased to correspond to the new conditions of reproduction. It is precisely this that constitutes the crisis in the structure of reproduction in the United States.

The days when U.S. ruling circles endeavored to maximize rates of economic development, when "bigger" usually meant "better," are gone. The time has come to move on to the equipment and technology of the future. But this will necessitate changes in the economic structure, the creation of new branches, the transformation of old ones, and the formation of different intersectorial ties and reproductive proportions. In other words, it will necessitate the substantial modification of the entire appearance of the American economy, particularly with the aid of research and development, the institution of the appropriate scientific and technical policy and the stimulation of technological progress.

The previously described trends in technological progress are acquiring physical form in structural changes in production. Let us examine some changes in the

sectorial structure of the U.S. economy, as the correlation of individual branches of production, and the reproductive structure, as the correlation of individual factors, or functional parts, of the process of reproduction.

The following basic sectorial changes were quite evident in the U.S. national economy in the 1960's and 1970's: the increasing relative importance of the public service sphere; the continuous decrease in the relative importance of branches for the production of primary raw materials, especially agriculture and the extractive industry; the declining relative importance of industry; the initial increase, followed by a decrease, in the relative importance of construction and communications.

The overall import of these changes in the sectorial structure of the economy consists in a gradual (in terms of time) move away from the high relative importance of raw material branches (agriculture and the extractive industry) and branches of industry with comparatively simple production technology (light industry and the food industry) to the enhancement of the role of capital-intensive and materials-intensive branches of industry, generally producing intermediate products (metallurgy and the chemical industry) and, finally, to the growing relative importance of branches of industry requiring high scientific input and branches for the manufacture of highly technical consumer goods and, in particular, the growing relative importance of the public service sphere.

When we assess these tendencies, we must remember, above all, that production decline in periods of economic crisis generally has the most severe effect on industry and this is why its share of the GNP decreases. The service sphere is affected least by a crisis. Its share is also increasing over the long range, particularly in crisis years, when this sphere acts as a kind of "stabilizer," counterbalancing the general decline in production.

Whereas long ago the public service sphere was a relatively insignificant sector of the U.S. economy, was essentially isolated from physical production in functional terms, and had little effect on levels of labor productivity and the operational efficiency of physical production, now the so-called non-production sphere, or the sphere of non-physical production, has become a huge sector of the economy, most of which serves physical production directly and is closely integrated with it. This qualitative change took place over several decades as a result of rising labor productivity in physical production and its control over most of the activities in the public service sphere within the bounds of the entire national economic complex.

Just as the "non-production" sphere, the sphere of physical production in the United States has also undergone important qualitative changes in recent decades. A much higher level of labor productivity has been reached in all branches and stages of production. Industry has been, and will continue to be, the most important branches of physical production; its share of the GNP will range from 25 to 30 percent. It will still guarantee a high level of technical development in other spheres of the economy and, above all, it is precisely in industry that scientific and technical achievements will be accumulated. New branches and production units will acquire even stronger positions in U.S. industry in the future, and the composition and structure of industry will change dynamically. Among the branches requiring high scientific input, a prominent place is occupied by the production of electronic computers, automation equipment and communication systems. The United

States may now be undergoing a second cybernetic revolution, based on the mass use of mini- and micro-computers, desk and pocket models, and the sharply increased production and widespread use of microprocessors.

The development of progressive industrial branches requiring high scientific input is closely related to the development of such spheres of mental production as science and education. Today this is no longer simply an important factor of economic growth, but also the basis for a new technical order.

The seriously rising economic significance of branches engaged in the production and dissemination of information has been striking. It is augmenting the informational content of the American GNP, and there is no reason to doubt that this process will gain in intensity. Half of all the manpower in the United States is already engaged in the collection, production, distribution, storage and interpretation of information.²³ This change has been an objective result of the increasingly acute contradiction between the growing scales of production and the complexity of economic ties on the one hand, and the limited possibilities of controlling them on the other.

The technological revolution is changing traditional beliefs about the production structure, just as it is changing beliefs about other matters. In particular, production cuts are now far from always an indicator of something "worse," just as production growth does not always signify something "better." Cuts in obsolete production serve to heighten overall economic efficiency. Universal production cuts can temporarily ease the course of structural modification and create additional prerequisites for the national economy's move to a new technical level. Under the conditions of production intensification, lower general rates of economic growth allow for the deeper and more intensive structural reorganization of the economy.

It appears that changes in the sectorial structure of the U.S. economy in the future will increase the relative importance of progressive branches of the processing industry. This is a long-apparent trend and a requirement of technological progress. The rise in the service sphere's share of the GNP (almost 40 percent in 1978) will slow down or completely stop in connection with the particular need for the structural modification of the physical production sphere. At the same time, the shares of agriculture (3 percent) and the processing industry (2.7 percent) could stop decreasing, and the share of the extractive industry is most likely to increase in connection with the mounting scarcity of raw materials. Within individual branches, structural changes will take place much more dramatically than on the level of the entire economy or of industry as a whole. Changes of this kind can already be seen in U.S. machine building, such as the noticeable growth of the proportional output of mining equipment, as well as boilers, foundry equipment and welding systems. The former is connected with the raw material crisis and the latter is connected with the move to more economical types of industrial equipment, machines and engines. According to the data of the AMERICAN MACHINIST, the average annual increase in the output of equipment of the second group is expected to range from 5.5 to 15 percent in 1980-1984.²⁴

In contrast to the sectorial structure of the economy, where changes have been largely of a long-range nature and were already apparent in the past, the reproduction structure of the U.S. economy has been distinguished by significant new changes in some cases.

This applies, above all, to the balance between accumulation and consumption. The relatively quick (for the United States) economic development of the nation in the postwar period was accompanied by heightened effectiveness and a lower accumulation norm. In 1950, for example, it was 19.1 percent, after which it tended to decrease, measuring 18.2 percent in 1970 and 17.5 percent in 1976. It reached its lowest level during the economic crisis of 1973-1975 (17.3 percent in 1975) and the first year after the crisis. Later, however, when capital investments in the economy began to grow rapidly and the rate of increase in the GNP slowed down, the accumulation norm rose slightly, approaching the 1950 level. It was 18.9 percent in 1978 and 18.8 percent in 1979.²⁵ We can assume that the economic crisis of 1980 will cause the accumulation norm in the United States to fall (the calculations here include accumulation in the government sector).

Whereas the accumulation norm rose between 1977 and 1979, the rate of increase in the GNP declined: 5.3 percent in 1977, 4.4 percent in 1978 and 2.3 percent in 1979.²⁶ This new tendency testifies to the declining effectiveness of accumulation in the nation, which was not a feature of the previous period. In these years the proportion accounted for by government spending in the GNP also rose, and that accounted for by personal consumption decreased slightly. In view of the fact that the investment process will apparently regain its previous intensity, although it will be irregular in terms of time,²⁷ in the near future after the U.S. economy has emerged from the present crisis, we can expect a slight rise in the accumulation norm. This will also be a result of the need for additional investments in environmental protection and equipment for energy conservation. We should not expect any significant rise in the accumulation norm, however, because this will cause a decline in the consumer norm, and the acute socioeconomic conflicts of the present day make this undesirable for ruling circles.

An important trend in the modification of the reproduction structure of the U.S. economy is the practice of assigning higher priority to the modernization and remodeling of production units than to their enlargement in the 1970's. This is attested to by the higher proportion accounted for by expenditures on the replacement of obsolete and worn means of labor in total capital investments (the proportion in industry is now around 70 percent). The obvious tendency to assign priority to investments in remodeling and modernization, accelerating the recouping of expenditures, will not establish the necessary conditions for higher rates of general economic growth. This is why the structural modification of the production sphere in the United States is being accompanied by relatively low rates of economic growth. But this does not mean that the rate of the modification is also low: The changes are more qualitative than quantitative in nature.

The qualitative modification of the production structure, products and technology of the monopolies was made necessary by rising overhead costs and the impossibility of maintaining the profit norm by expanding the output of traditional products. The monopolies are striving to increase the ability of production to undergo quick reorganization in response to changing demand. Although the process of remodeling and modernization does not lead to the significant growth of output, it does considerably enhance the quality parameters and commercial features of products. Therefore, from this standpoint as well, it would seem that the thorough and comprehensive structural reorganization of the U.S. economy, in line with the need for its intensification, can only be accompanied by relatively low rates of economic growth (given the presence of reserve capacities and accumulated funds).

for investment). Conversely, this kind of reorganization would be difficult at a time of rapid growth and in the absence of adequate reserves.

Another important reproduction balance is the correlation of total material expenditures to the final product--that is, the materials-intensiveness of production.

In the 1970's (just as during the entire postwar period), the materials-intensiveness of national production in the United States tended to decrease (despite the rising cost of raw materials) when calculated in constant prices; and this tendency will continue. What is more, as it became increasingly difficult to supply the U.S. economy with raw materials, the materials-intensiveness of national production decreased more rapidly. Rapidly rising prices, particularly the prices of crude resources, materials and energy, heightened economic incentives to reduce the materials-intensiveness of production. The energy requirements of national production (energy consumption per dollar of GNP) began to decrease quite noticeably in the mid-1970's when the conditions of the nation's oil supply system deteriorated. According to the calculations of D. Perry, economist from the Brookings Institution, energy requirements in the private sector of the U.S. economy decreased at a rate of 1.3-1.6 percent annually between 1949 and 1973, and the figure in the 1973-1976 period--that is, when the energy problem became particularly severe--was 3.7 percent a year.²⁸

The most important factors involved in the reduction of materials-intensiveness have always been the replacement of some types of natural resources with other, more effective types, including artificial resources, which allow for reduced energy expenditures per unit of final product, the more thorough and comprehensive processing of raw materials and the tendency to miniaturize technical equipment. Less expensive--that is, lower-quality--raw materials became more important when problems arose in the extraction of many types of minerals. It appears that, in spite of the anticipated mass-scale use of new, less economically beneficial sources of raw materials in production, the reduction of the materials-intensiveness of U.S. production will continue.

As for the capital-intensiveness of production (the ratio of fixed productive capital to the GNP), the factors which will determine tendencies toward its change in the future seem extremely contradictory and will most likely cause this indicator to fluctuate even more than in the past. The long-range tendency toward the reduction of capital-intensiveness in the United States will, in the author's opinion, become more pronounced through the development of capital-conserving areas of technological progress. But the main factor will be the resolution of energy, raw material and ecological problems, as well as social problems that have become acute in recent years, including problems in the area of urbanization, which will require large capital investments unconnected with manufacturing output.

Therefore, the 1980's will be a period of not only relatively slower rates of economic growth in the United States, but also of thorough structural modification and the implementation of several serious measures to solve energy, raw material and ecological problems.

The distinctive features of the chief reproductive balance in the U.S. economy--the correlation between the first and second subdivisions of national production--are striking. The deciding influence here is exerted by the material requirements

of production and the production accumulation norm. In view of the fact that the intensification of economic processes and the U.S. economy's gradual move in the postwar period to forms of reproduction that conserve more resources have kept these indicators from rising, the objective basis for the quicker growth of the first subdivision has disappeared. Calculations based on American intersectorial balance sheets indicate that the correlation between the two subdivisions was generally stable in the 1950's and 1960's: In 1947 the first subdivision accounted for 58.2 percent of the total social product of the U.S. national economy, in 1958 it was 57.9 percent, in 1963 it was 57.5 percent, and in 1970 it was 57.2 percent. In the beginning of the 1970's, however, the figure rose perceptibly in connection with the growth of housing construction and the relative (and temporary) decrease in military expenditures and amounted to 53.8 percent in 1972.²⁹

The U.S. economy has now reached a high level of technical development. A strong production and technological base has been established. The present process of economic intensification in the nation is objectively leading to a relative reduction in the need for increased production of the means of production. This means that the output of consumer goods can be increased without raising the cost of the output of the means of production, and that the growth rates of the two subdivisions could be equalized to a considerable extent. It is not surprising, for example, that virtually the entire output of machine tools in the United States is now being used to replace obsolete and worn tools, and not to augment the inventory of machine tools (we have excluded export tools from these calculations).

In addition to the previously described patterns of material resource utilization, the ratio of expenditures on manpower to the U.S. national income must be examined. This is an equally important national economic correlation which largely determines the effectiveness of national production.

Expenditures on manpower (total wages) rise when the size of the labor force increases; when salary rates rise under the influence of the workers' struggle for their rights and the objective process by which the cost of reproducing the labor force increases; when labor productivity rises as a result of the qualitative improvement of the labor force itself. Calculations based on official U.S. statistics testify that proportional expenditures on manpower in national income tend to rise over the long range (60.2 percent in 1929, 65.5 percent in 1950, 76.3 percent in 1970, and 75.7 percent in 1978).³⁰ The development of this tendency was interrupted in the 1970's as a result of slower rates of economic growth, higher labor productivity and the failure of wages to keep up with rising prices. However, also as a result of these circumstances, the proportion accounted for by total wages in the national income is fairly high.

The economic development of the United States demonstrates that the cost and value of manpower are constantly rising and that technological progress would be impossible without a rise in real wages. Low wages impede technological progress and lead to the deterioration of technical equipment and the destruction of productive forces. Changes in the structure of the U.S. labor force under the influence of the technological revolution are based on the objective move away from simple labor to more complex labor and its general intellectualization. The technological revolution augments the role of the working class in social development, in the improvement of production and in the implementation of scientific and technical achievements. Its social and intellectual requirements are elevated and its

ability to perform scientifically substantiated and efficient social activity increases. The elevation of the public standard of living and the growth of real income play a tremendous role in the qualitative improvement of the labor force. A labor force meeting the requirements of the technological revolution cannot take shape if the choice of material goods and services is limited. In this respect, enhancement of the material well-being and spiritual development of the labor force is an essential condition for the continued functioning of production at a time of technological revolution, especially in connection with production automation.

The personal consumption sphere has begun to play an absolutely new economic role in the reproductive mechanism of the United States. As the final link in the reproductive cycle, it is having an increasing effect on the output volume, structure and qualitative parameters of the means of production. During the lengthy process of historical and socioeconomic development and as a result of the persistent struggle of the working class, the personal consumption sphere in the United States, as the basis for the reproduction of a larger and much better labor force, has noticeably expanded and become a powerful factor determining total public demand, making specific demands on the quantity and quality of means of production. Today this sphere is strongly influencing the cyclical development of the U.S. economy. The current economic crisis was preceded by a decline in the real wages of the workers. Conversely, increased total consumption has more than once served as the beginning of cyclical recovery and ascent.

Therefore, a deep-seated process of serious structural change in the U.S. economy is affecting both the sphere of research activity and the sphere of production. The latest resource-conserving equipment and technology are being utilized more extensively and production automation is developing. These changes will continue into the 1980's and will become more pronounced.

The process of the structural reorganization of the U.S. economy and its move to a new technical order have not been devoid of difficulties and conflicts. The definite impact derived from increasing structural balance in the correlation of production volumes in a number of branches has been accompanied by the birth of new disparities resulting from overall uneven development and the shortage of funds for research and development and for production investments. The elimination of these disparities will also require a great deal of time and effort. Structural changes are being seriously impeded by intensive inflation and the rising cost of credit, which are complicating mass-scale investments and the reorganization of research and development expenditures.

The most important reserve American capitalism hopes to use to overcome the crisis in the general structure of reproduction consists in the acceleration of technological progress, the establishment of stronger ties between science and production, the enhancement of the economic effectiveness of research and development expenditures, and the institution of structural changes in production.

FOOTNOTES

1. "National Patterns of R and D Resources, 1953--1978-79," NSF, Wash., 1978, p 36.

2. P. Pascarella, "Technology. Fire in a Dark World," N.Y., 1979, p 20.
3. "Science Indicators, 1978," Wash., 1979, p 46.
4. "The President's Industrial Innovation Initiatives," Wash., 1979, p 10.
5. "Science Indicators, 1978," p 44; SCIENCE RESOURCES STUDIES HIGHLIGHTS, 8 May 1979, p 1.
6. "Science Indicators, 1978," p 42.
7. "National Patterns of R and D Resources, 1953--1978-79," p 36.
8. SCIENCE RESOURCES STUDIES HIGHLIGHTS, 8 May 1979, p 3.
9. "The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1981," Wash., 1980, p 6.
10. CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, 4 February 1980, p 15.
11. "Economic Report of the President, January 1980."
12. BUSINESS WEEK, 7 July 1980, p 48.
13. "National Academy of Sciences. Technological Innovation and the U.S. Economy," Wash., 14 November 1978, p 57.
14. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 18 January 1971, p 41.
15. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1980, p 91.
16. "Science Indicators, 1978," p 11; "Science and Technology Report, 1978," Wash., October 1978, p 21.
17. BIKI, 7 February 1980, p 4.
18. "A National Policy for Materials: Research and Resources," Wash., 1978, p 659.
19. "U.S. Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986: Prospects, Problems and Patterns, vol 9, Technological Change," Wash., 1976, p 27.
20. "Technological Innovation for a Dynamic Economy," p 179; "Science Indicators, 1978," p 60.
21. AMERICAN MACHINIST, March 1980, p 167.
22. For more detail, see A. N. Tkachenko, "United States: The State and the Non-Monopoly Sector of the Economy" in Issue No 9 for 1980.
23. "U.S. Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986," p 39.
24. AMERICAN MACHINIST, March 1980, p 193.

25. "National Income and Product Accounts, 1929-1974," Wash., 1975, pp 7, 125; SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, July 1979, pp 15, 41; March 1980, pp 41, 29.
26. "Economic Report of the President, January 1980," p 205.
27. A special article describing the investment process is to be published in Issue No 12 of the journal--Editor's note.
28. D. Perry, "Potential Output: Recent Issues and Present Trends in U.S. Production Capacity; Estimating the Utilization Gap, Working Paper 23," 1977, pp 6-13.
29. "Urovni i tendentsii ekonomicheskogo razvitiya glavnnykh kapitalisticheskikh stran" [Economic Development Levels and Trends in the Main Capitalist Countries], Moscow, 1977, p 176; the figure for 1972 was calculated by L. P. Nochevkina. In view of the fact that the latest of the published U.S. inter-sectorial balance sheets was the one for 1972, there is no other way of calculating the balance between the two subdivisions as yet.
30. "National Income and Product Accounts, 1929-1974"; SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, July 1979. When these figures are assessed, it should be borne in mind that the total wages in U.S. statistics include the huge and constantly increasing salaries of top-level managers of corporations, which essentially represent part of monopoly profits.

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STRATEGIC PARITY AND THE POLICY OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 29-40

[Article by A. G. Arbatov]

[Text] The J. Carter administration's 4-year term of office is nearing its end. The results of its activity in many areas of foreign policy are of serious concern to all who support detente and a curbing of the arms race. This applies particularly to American policy in the strategic arms sphere. As is known, President Carter came to the White House with high-sounding pledges relating to the achievement of "radical agreements" on strategic arms limitation (SALT). Four years later, a by no means comforting picture is to be observed in this sphere. Under the pretext of the events in Afghanistan the administration has postponed indefinitely ratification of the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty, which was signed in June 1979. At the same time, the Pentagon's new nuclear programs are being implemented at full speed, and the U.S. military budget is growing from year to year. But in spite of this, Washington officially continues to give assurance of its devotion to the principles of strategic parity and also of its concern to see the SALT II Treaty take effect and to continue negotiations with the USSR.¹

A great deal in this situation will depend on the answer to the question of what actually constitute the real aims of Washington's present policy in the strategic arms sphere. And, more specifically: What missions are being assigned the United States' new nuclear programs and is the United States still interested in SALT agreements with the Soviet Union? An analysis of these problems is important irrespective of the outcome of the 1980 presidential election inasmuch as today's decisions in the said sphere will, by virtue of the specifics of the strategic programs, be reflected in the military balance and SALT prospects for many years to come.

A departure from many of the constructive ideas and initiatives which formed the basis of the military relaxation at the start of the 1970's has become increasingly apparent over a number of years now in Washington's policy. These supporting principles in the strategic arms sphere consist of the mutual recognition by the USSR and the United States of the objectively evolved overall military equilibrium or parity and the powers' mutual renunciation of attempts to acquire military superiority. The SALT talks, whose cornerstone was the principle of the parties' equality and identical security, were also based on this.

What had actually changed in the objective strategic situation by the end of the 1970's, when the arms race received an additional push, as it were, and the SALT process began to encounter increasingly serious obstacles? And do these changes constitute grounds for the United States to hope to achieve nuclear superiority in the next decade?

In examining this question it should be observed that the United States' recognition of nuclear parity on the threshold of the 1970's was by no means a gift to the Soviet Union on the part of America's political leaders which they could take back on a whim. The recognition of parity did not come about as the result of the theoretical deliberations of experts, just as it did not come about on account of a spontaneously evolved domestic political balance in the United States between the aggressive forces of militarism and the forces of realism and restraint. These internal factors undoubtedly played a very important part, but they were, for all that, secondary, and had themselves taken shape (over a long and agonizingly difficult period, moreover) under the influence of objective international realities. Among these figured primarily the formation of overall equilibrium in the strategic balance between the USSR and the United States and the failure of American aggression in Vietnam.

Throughout the 1960's the United States had attempted with might and main to avoid recognizing the inevitability of military equilibrium and endeavored to acquire nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. To this end the United States embarked on an appreciable increase in military appropriations at this time,² the Pentagon embarked on an unprecedented buildup in ground- and sea-based ballistic missiles and Secretary of Defense R. McNamara experimented with strategic concepts--from "counterforce" through "limited damage" to "assured destruction." But all the accelerated measures proved in vain. Throughout the decade the possibilities of the military and political use of the United States' nuclear potential constantly narrowed under the impact of the increase in the dimensions and fighting efficiency of the Soviet strategic forces, which was an act of retaliation to the accelerated buildup of American arms.

It is also fitting to recall that during the 1968 election campaign R. Nixon rained criticism on the idea of parity and called for the restoration of the United States' "undisputed nuclear superiority." However, on entering the White House he was forced to recognize comparatively quickly the existence of overall strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States. A big part in this respect was played by the conclusion that this advantage or the other in the quantity or quality of strategic arms would not give the United States much if they were insufficient for perpetrating aggression against the USSR with impunity. But what this required was a potential capable of destroying the enemy with preemptive strikes and simultaneously reducing one's own losses to an acceptable level. Such nuclear superiority, many American specialists believe, became an impossible dream for the United States as of the mid-1960's at the very latest. L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, emphasized in this connection that the very concept of superiority "becomes meaningless given the enormous arsenals of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles."³

Incidentally, the process of building up the United States' strategic might was not at a standstill in the 1970's either. This reflected the pressure of the

military-industrial complex, the powerful momentum of programs put in force earlier and, no less significant, the inertia of military-political thinking in U.S. ruling circles. As a result of the development of MIRV dispensing reentry vehicles there was a more than fourfold increase in the number of nuclear warheads in the United States' missile arsenal of approximately 60 percent of its ground- and sea-based missile forces.⁴ Furthermore, a qualitative improvement in the strategic systems was undertaken and a new generation of nuclear arms developed.

At the same time, it was precisely the 1970's which convincingly demonstrated that the attempts of the United States to disrupt strategic parity to its own advantage are not only fruitless but also make its own strategic position more complicated, summoning up new rounds of the arms race. Faced with the United States' military programs, the Soviet Union naturally took the necessary steps to strengthen its defense. At the same time the evolution of the Soviet-American nuclear balance in these years was even then occurring under the conditions of the stabilizing impact of the first SALT agreements, which curbed the arms race to a certain extent. In sum, if anything did in fact change in the objective military situation in the course of the past decade, it was the fact that the nuclear equilibrium became even more apparent. Certain disproportions in the sphere of the strategic balance on which the disciples of an arms race in the United States had earlier relied disappeared or were reduced.

L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in this connection at the end of the 1970's: "Never before has our country had such tremendous economic and scientific-technical potential. Never before has it been so strong and its defense capability so firm." Providing for the defense of the USSR and its allies and maintaining the unreserved capacity for delivering a devastating retaliatory strike against any potential aggressor, the Soviet strategic forces have become a powerful political means of restraining an aggressor and frustrating his dangerous plans. As the CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum decree points out, "the military-strategic equilibrium that has been achieved between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism is a gain of fundamental, historic significance.... Hopes of shaking this equilibrium are doomed to failure."⁶

Thus the fundamental factors of the strategic balance which on the threshold of the 1970's caused the United States' recognition of parity and made possible the SALT talks and agreements have become even more obvious 10 years later. At the same time it has to be admitted that the international climate as a whole and the domestic political atmosphere in the United States have become increasingly less conducive to efforts to curb the arms race since the latter half of the 1970's.

The state of discouragement of American ruling circles owing to the failures of imperialism's foreign policy and the exacerbation of its economic and social problems and the nostalgia of broad philistine strata for "America's former greatness" and "strong authority" have prepared the ground for a massive offensive by right-wing political groupings in the United States. The thrust of chauvinist sentiments and the pressure of militaristic circles have exerted an increasingly big influence from year to year on the policy of the Democratic Administration, which has been rent by internal disagreements and lacks stable support in the Congress. Speeding up the arms race and applying the brakes to the process of military relaxation were chosen by the Carter Administration under these conditions as the "simplest"

means of demonstrating its "firmness" in foreign policy and pacifying right-wing opposition with the country. In 1979 the buildup of the arms race was used by the administration to a considerable extent as "compensation" to the military-industrial complex for its consent to the SALT II Treaty. At the start of 1980 its very ratification was sacrificed to the anti-Soviet hysteria unleashed in the United States in connection with the events in Afghanistan.

As the 1980 election campaign unfolded, pressure on the administration from aggressive reactionary circles, rallied under the banners of the Republican Party, intensified. A striking example of this pressure was the Republicans' election platform adopted at their convention in July 1980.⁷ It is indisputable that the political declarations and military programs of the Carter government in an election year have been intended, to a large extent, to win over the disciples of militarism and power politics in the United States.

And yet the question is far from exhausted by the singularities of the present domestic political situation in the United States or by current international complications, however important they may be for the formulation of Washington's current policy. In a longer-term perspective the sources of the serious difficulties in curbing the nuclear arms race are to be found in a number of basic trends of the U.S. military-political strategy. It is exceptionally difficult for the United States to adapt to a situation of Soviet-American strategic parity inasmuch as in the first postwar decades the cornerstone of Washington's foreign policy and military strategy was the concept of the United States' unconditional nuclear superiority. Former political and strategic concepts were revised to a certain extent at the start of the 1970's under the conditions of overall military equilibrium and the upturn of the relaxation of tension. However, this revision did not go so far as to remove the contradictory nature of the current American course pertaining to a number of most important aspects. In the complex situation in the international arena and within the United States, Washington has stepped up on the threshold of the 1980's the quest for ways of surmounting existing contradictions on paths which manifestly run counter to the interests of the military balance and the tasks of curbing the arms race.

In accordance with the "Carter doctrine," Washington is again increasing the stress on confrontation with the USSR and the direct use of military force in various crisis regions of the world. The nuclear equilibrium has left the new version of the American "from a position of strength" policy "without a roof," so to speak. For this reason, together with the plans to create a "rapid deployment force" made up of general-purpose forces of the United States, the search has been stepped up for ways to insure the greater military-political applicability of the American nuclear potential also. While proclaiming its devotion to the concepts of "restraint" and a "retaliatory strike" in words, Washington is in practice unwilling to abandon the search for the possibility of a preventive nuclear strike in some form or another.

When the overall Soviet-American equilibrium of offensive strategic arms was fixed by the 1972 Interim Agreement and ABM systems limited by the 1972 ABM Treaty and the 1974 protocol thereto, the stress in the United States was put on an increase in the flexibility of the retargeting, yield and accuracy of the cluster nose cones (MK-12A). J. Schlesinger, who was the head of the Pentagon at that time, formulated the "essential equivalence" and "selective nuclear strikes" concepts, which

were intended to substantiate "counterforce" attacks--that is, strikes against the ground components of another country's strategic forces (missile launch sites, command posts and so forth).⁸ The Pentagon claimed that they would not obligatorily prompt a retaliatory strike against cities since the reserve low-vulnerability components of the nuclear arsenals (sea-based missiles, aerial patrol aircraft) would allegedly be able to hold both sides' population and industrial centers "hostage" even in the course of an exchange of strikes against stationary ground military targets.⁹ In order to bring closer the introduction of this concept in nuclear strategy and reduce its cost, J. Schlesinger even planned to begin the deployment of powerful new MX ICBM's in the launch silos housing the Minuteman missiles.¹⁰ In view of the presumed increase in their vulnerability, this would have signified an unambiguous orientation of the ground-based missile forces toward delivering a preemptive strike.

Now, when the United States has recognized that it is losing its supposed advantages in this sphere also, a new nuclear concept has come to replace the old ones--the so-called "countervalue" concept.¹¹ Its essence is to secure for the United States advantages in nuclear forces such that following possible versions of an exchange of "counterforce" strikes the United States would preserve a superior capability for hitting population and industrial centers and could restrain the other side's retaliatory strike. Reliance is now being put on superiority not simply in the potential for "counterforce" strikes but in the invulnerable potential of "counterforce." "Effective restraint requires," Secretary of Defense H. Brown has declared, "that a sufficiently vast and flexible potential be created which would make it possible to inflict selective strikes on a number of military and other targets and, following this, retain a considerable reserve of nuclear might for a considerable length of time."¹² The Pentagon plans to achieve such possibilities thanks to the deployment throughout the 1980's of a new generation of strategic nuclear arms.

Recognition in the United States of the truth that its tremendous thermonuclear might, which is constantly being increased and improved, is incapable of either a military or political application (apart from the passive restraint of a purely hypothetical nuclear strike where every more or less rational criterion was long since exceeded many times over) is being complicated not only by many political but also military-strategic factors.

Intensive scientific-technical progress is continuously engendering new types and models of weapons capable over the long term of destabilizing the military balance. The influential military-industrial complex is constantly inventing future "threats" in the event of the other side's deployment of such systems and under this pretext is striving for the creation of new types of weapons by the United States. Owing to the duration (10-15 years) and the tremendous cost of the development and deployment of strategic arms, military planning in this sphere has to be undertaken for many years ahead, and this affords the Pentagon and private strategists a broad field for the compilation of threatening scenarios. The existing nuclear arsenals are subject to deterioration and obsolescence, and the interested circles demand their "timely" replacement with more sophisticated systems. Finally, in the very intricate strategic equation the nuclear forces of the USSR and the United States consist of different component items and are not a mirror image of each other. These objective, historically evolved disproportions were caused by differences in the geographic location of the two powers and the singularities of the development of their technology, military policy and strategy.

Earlier the United States relied on its "nuclear superiority" (which, however, did not exclude periodic campaigns in connection with American "lagging" sometimes in this, sometimes in the other types of arms) in its approach to all these problems. However paradoxical it may seem, under the conditions of parity the supporters of an arms race have acquired big opportunities for speculating on disproportions and complexities in the military balance and juggling figures and forecasts to substantiate imaginary future "threats" to the security of the United States.

A striking illustration of this is a noisy campaign which has been conducted in the United States in recent years concerning "Soviet superiority" in ICBM's, particularly the heavy models. This campaign was the main area of the opposition's undermining of the SALT II Treaty and also a principal level of the military-industrial complex' pressure for the adoption of nuclear programs for the 1980's, stepped up even more than planned by the Carter Administration. According to the predictions of the notorious Committee on the Present Danger, the USSR will be able to realize this "superiority" at the start of the 1980's through a capacity to destroy, with a small proportion of its own forces, up to 90 percent of the American ICBM's in launch silos. And then, according to the gloomy prophesy of P. Nitze, a representative of this committee, "the United States will be left with the possibility of merely launching several hundred missiles against the cities of the other side" while the "remaining U.S. forces and its population and industry will be defenseless in the face of more than 10,000 megatons of Soviet third and fourth strikes."¹³

Discussions about "Soviet superiority" in ground-based ICBM's are a typical example of how the supporters of an arms race arbitrarily exaggerate individual disproportions of the nuclear balance favoring the USSR while glossing over the significance of the disproportions in other components and parameters of the strategic forces advantageous to the United States. In the 1960's and 1970's the Pentagon entirely deliberately stressed a number of areas of military equipment development for sea-based missile forces and heavy strategic bombers. Elementary logic suggests that in the overall ceilings on strategic delivery systems and systems with dispensing reentry vehicles, equal for both parties, determined by the SALT II Treaty, the advantages of one power in some elements of nuclear forces should be compensated for by advantages of the other party in other components of the nuclear arsenal.

As far as scenarios of an exchange of nuclear strikes are concerned, many authoritative studies cast doubt on the feasibility of selective "counterforce" attacks in practice.¹⁴ In any event, the purely theoretical vulnerability of the siloed American ICBM's should be viewed not within the artificial framework of this element of the triad, which is of a different value for the USSR and the United States, but in the context of the fighting efficiency of U.S. strategic forces as a whole. The ground-based missile component constitutes only 24 percent of American nuclear forces in number of warheads. If the possibilities of both sides for a "counterforce" strike (and, correspondingly, their capacity for a retaliatory strike) with regard for the entire complex of factors relating to the problem are compared, no "Soviet superiority" exists in this respect either. This was observed in certain speeches by specialists at Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the question of "ICBM vulnerability" has now become the main problem of U.S. policy in the strategic arms sphere. In the budget report for fiscal year 1981, H. Brown stated that, despite all the doubts as to the likelihood and

feasibility of a "counterforce" strike against American missile silos, "it would be unwise to reconcile ourselves to the vulnerability of this component of the triad as a permanent fact, considering what might happen with the survivability of the two other elements of the strategic forces."¹⁶ Accordingly, the new U.S. nuclear programs are being assigned the goal of simultaneously reducing the vulnerability of the strategic forces and increasing their "counterforce" potential. As planned by the Pentagon, this two-in-one task will be provided for by the deployment, in the first half of the 1980's, of the MX supereffective ICBM in mobile launch complexes and the more powerful Trident II ballistic missile submarine. Diagrams of operational departments of the Pentagon were made public in 1978-1979, indicating the correlation of forces of the two powers in the number of warheads and the total capacity for area destruction (equivalent megatonnage) both prior to a maximally effective exchange of "counterforce" strikes and after it. It graphically demonstrated the calculations of the Defense Department, in accordance with which the cumulative curve will increasingly tilt in favor of the United States roughly from the mid-1980's.¹⁷

It thus becomes obvious that the United States has set itself the goal of disrupting the existing strategic balance. Preserving and even extending the disproportions which work to its advantage, it is calculating on changing, to its advantage, the balancing disproportions advantageous to the other side and thereby obtaining manifest unilateral military advantages. Primarily by means of deployment of the MX system, the Pentagon proposes to sharply increase the invulnerability of its ICBM's and at the same time, with the help of this comparatively small part of its nuclear triad, endanger the existing component of the strategic forces of the other side. As became known in August 1980, the said concept was consummated in Presidential Directive 59. The abovementioned "countervailing" strategy, which is intended to increase to a certain extent the military and political utility of the American nuclear potential,¹⁸ is connected with it.

In addition, insofar as the United States cannot fail to take into consideration the fact that the Soviet Union will adopt retaliatory measures to strengthen its defense reliance is also being put on the notorious "economic exhaustion" of the other side. The Pentagon hopes to force the other side to increase military spending, and in a sphere, moreover, deemed less unfavorable for the United States. Secretary of Defense H. Brown says candidly in this connection: "If the Soviets consider it necessary to increase their potential (for a retaliatory strike), they will have to allocate considerable additional resources to restore the invulnerability of their ICBM's. Such a situation would correspond more to the requirements of stability than if they were afforded an opportunity to render our ICBM's vulnerable and, having achieved this goal, switched their resources to other programs even less desirable for us (the reference is mainly to antisubmarine and air defense--A. A.)."¹⁹

Despite the official declarations of the American leadership, this policy of the United States is destabilizing the strategic parity, spurring on the arms race and military spending and raising nuclear confrontation to an even higher level. But the practical feasibility of the goals outlined by Washington here remains a matter of great doubt even in certain circles within the United States. The policy of accelerating the renewal of all three components of the nuclear triad adopted by the Pentagon in the mid-1970's has already been revised somewhat. The program of

the building of Trident submarines is seriously behind schedule, the date of the deployment of the MX missiles has been changed from 1983 to 1986 and the new B-1 bomber has been canceled altogether. The reason for this lies not, of course, in the restrained nature of U.S. military policy, but in the economic and technical difficulties of the creation of a new generation of arms of tremendous cost and complexity.

The U.S. ruling circles' hope for the achievement of a preponderance in the strategic arms sphere on the paths of "countervalue" strategy is even less substantiated, given the present correlation of forces, than the previous American plans of building "nuclear superiority." The Pentagon's leaders have accumulated a wealth of experience of miscalculations and disappointments in the last three-plus decades in constructing forecasts concerning the possibilities of the Soviet Union and its reaction to U.S. military measures.

D. P. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, emphasized in this connection: "Those who are counting on achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union with the help of such weapons should recall that the economy, science and technology in our country are now at such a high level that we are in a position to create in the shortest time any type of weapon on which the enemies of peace might care to rely."²⁰

Attempts to drain the Soviet Union economically have failed repeatedly in the past and are doomed on this occasion also. Furthermore, they are having a "boomerang effect" for the United States itself. For example, according to the Pentagon's preliminary estimates, which, as a rule, considerably underestimate impending military expenditure, the cost of the planned strategic programs is put at 38 billion dollars.²¹ And this is only up to 1986, that is, up to the planned deployment of the MX system, which will evidently be the most costly of all U.S. nuclear programs and will require appropriations of no less than 30-40 billion dollars. Taking into consideration the tremendous cost of the programs laid down in the sphere of the general-purpose armed forces, the pessimistic forecasts of the United States' economic growth rate in the first half of the 1980's and the government's inability to cope with runaway inflation, the plans for the economic exhaustion of the Soviet Union appear utterly without foundation.

Apart from the spheres of direct Soviet-American military balance, a serious source of difficulties for the United States with the loss of its past nuclear superiority is its mutual relations with its main allies in Western Europe and Japan. In the military sphere these relations have traditionally been built on the principle of Washington's unconditional dominance enshrined in the structure of the NATO bloc and the American-Japanese alliance. In the situation of strategic parity both in the United States and in the countries allied to it doubt has increasingly come to be cast on the reliability of American "nuclear guarantees"--the durability of the central military basis of the political leadership of the United States--which, in the event of an extensive military conflict in Europe, provided for the preemptive use of its tactical and, subsequently, its strategic nuclear weapons. Certain circles in Western Europe are taking advantage of the United States' loss of nuclear superiority to achieve greater political independence of the United States (a French critic has observed that the American military potential in NATO no longer provides a cover and that "only formal patronage is left").²² Under this pretext other political forces are demanding a steep buildup in Atlantic military

might, and certain groupings aspire to Western Europe acquiring full-blooded military, including nuclear, independence. The question of the credit-worthiness of U.S. commitments in NATO had become a permanent cause of allied disagreements, but the debate in connection with SALT II made it unprecedentedly acute.

For the purpose of changing the existing military balance on the European continent, strengthening its nuclear guarantees in NATO and, at the same time, consolidating the leading position among the allies, Washington imposed on the Brussels session of the North Atlantic bloc's council in December 1979 the decision to produce and deploy in Western Europe, as of 1983, 572 Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-based cruise missiles capable of striking deep into the European part of the USSR. In addition to everything else, the buildup of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles was, in NATO's plans, to have secured a "position of strength" in negotiations with the USSR on limiting the so-called "Eurostrategic" arms which it has been proposed to begin within the SALT III framework.

But this step by NATO would be negatively reflected in the prospects for SALT III even in the event of the timely entry into force of the Vienna treaty. The buildup of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles cannot be qualified, from the USSR's standpoint, other than as an attempt to alter the overall strategic balance in favor of the United States. Essentially in addition to the 2,400--2,250 strategic delivery systems authorized for both sides in accordance with SALT II, the United States is planning "above the limit" to increase the number of nuclear weapon delivery systems targeted on the Soviet Union by approximately 25 percent thanks to the intermediate-range missiles.

Naturally, the USSR cannot fail to take account of this fact in assessing its defense requirements, and this also will be reflected in possible future SALT III negotiations. But both sides hoped at these to achieve agreements on a number of questions of a "substantial reduction in strategic arms" and new "quality restrictions" on their improvement.²³

Inasmuch as the SALT II Treaty is now "up in the air," it is impossible to turn to a solution of questions provisionally controlled by the protocol (such as banning the deployment of ground- and sea-based cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers) in the context of the next SALT agreement, as proposed. Yet the protocol to the Treaty Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms--an inalienable part of the entire package of Vienna agreements--expires on 31 December 1981. NATO's December (1979) decision has put up an even more rigid political barrier to an understanding being arrived at on this question within the SALT III framework and simultaneously destroyed the basis for talks on limiting intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the European continent proposed by the Soviet Union on 6 October 1979.²⁴ As a result we have most serious negative consequences, both for the stability of strategic parity and the military situation in Europe and also for the dialog on arms limitation.

And as far as strengthening American nuclear guarantees in NATO is concerned, here also the Brussels decision in all likelihood will not achieve its prescribed goals. If NATO's dangerous plans are not curbed by agreements, their implementation will, for understandable reasons, call forth the socialist countries' retaliatory measures. The level of nuclear confrontation on the continent will be raised appreciably with all the ensuing negative consequences for European security and

military and political relaxation. But even under these conditions the decision on the use of nuclear missiles from European bases remains with the United States. And it cannot fail to take account of the fact that, in the event of nuclear aggression, a retaliatory strike will also hit its own territory, irrespective of the bases from which the missile attack against the USSR is launched.

A fundamental problem of NATO strategy lies not in the growth of the "Soviet threat," as militaristic circles in the West assert; this problem is caused by the impossibility of reconciling the objective situation of strategic parity between the USSR and the United States with the plans for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, which are the cornerstone of the "nuclear threshold" and "escalation dominance" concepts in NATO strategy.²⁵ The sole practicable method of a solution of the problem consists of the mutual refusal of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to be the first to use both nuclear and conventional arms and, subsequently, of a reduction in the military confrontation on the continent and the creation of a dependable system of collective European security. But this path is at odds with the United States' present policy of consolidating NATO through the buildup of its military might under American auspices.

The Soviet Union presented a new constructive initiative during the July 1980 meeting in Moscow between the leaders of the USSR and FRG. It provides for negotiations to be started on questions of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe in organic connection with a discussion of questions of the American ground-based nuclear missiles which already exist here. A start could be made on these negotiations without waiting for ratification of the SALT II Treaty, but the agreements reached thereat would be implemented after the treaty comes into force. The USSR's proposals provide an outlet from the dangerous deadlock which has come about through the fault of the West in the resolution of problems of military relaxation.

It is thus obvious that a number of the current trends of the military-political strategy of the United States and NATO are most seriously complicating the stabilization of the military equilibrium. But in addition to all else, progress along the mutually beneficial path of strategic arms limitation, which is approved by the American leaders in words, is encountering serious obstacles created by the United States' practical policy in the sphere of the SALT negotiations.

The SALT II Treaty signed in June 1979 embodied a finely balanced compromise of both parties' interests in the most complex questions of strategic equilibrium. However, the initial unconstructive approach to the tasks and ways of nuclear arms limitation expressed in SALT drafts proposed at the time of then Secretary of State G. Vance's visit to Moscow (March 1977) remains an essential element of American policy. The American Government, as is evident from official sources, has not abandoned hopes for a return to the March (1977) version of the agreement at possible future SALT III talks.²⁶

The SALT model developed in the United States is built, in brief, on the premise that ground-based stationary ICBM's are a destabilizing element of the military balance--that is, they increase the likelihood of a preemptive strike. It is claimed that they not only create a threat to the survivability of the ICBM's of the other side but also, presumably, are themselves vulnerable to an enemy missile strike. Accordingly, it is considered essential to maximally reduce this component of the strategic forces and limit it with agreements and to transfer as large a

part of the nuclear arsenal as possible to sea-based missile forces and long-range bombers. The latter are theoretically less vulnerable in the open seas and in the air and also less suitable for a "counterforce" strike.²⁷ The administration does not conceal its calculations that the threat of the deployment of the MX and Trident II "counterforce" systems after 1985 (after the expiry of the SALT II Treaty and with the entry into force of a possible new treaty) will force the USSR into unilateral concessions on this question at subsequent SALT talks.

It is clear from the first glance that the American concept of strategic stability and arms limitation on the basis thereof is not the fruit of abstract logical arguments, as its authors are striving to prove. This concept is closely tied in with the particular features of the United States' military policy, which is, in turn, conditioned by the specifics of its geographic location, technical development and so forth. It is common knowledge, for example, that the geographic location of the United States and its allies is highly conducive to the use of sea-based missile forces. And maintaining a large-scale aviation component in the United States' nuclear triad is explained not so much by strategic rationality as by the interests and traditions of a powerful echelon of the military-industrial complex--the Air Force, the Strategic Air Command and their industrial contractors.

Why in questions connected with the concept of stability and the tasks of SALT has the United States arrogated to itself a monopoly on the final say and the right to impose it on the other side? After all, the latter's approach to these problems could be entirely different from the American approach by virtue of the singularities of its location and historical development.

The history of SALT demonstrates in the example of the most important agreements of the 1970's the possibility of a mutual acceptable solution of the abovementioned problems given on both sides goodwill and the resolve to bring matters to a conclusion. However, in addition to all the complexities of the quest for an essential compromise on the SALT questions under discussion the business is being most seriously complicated by the effect on the process of the negotiations of more general trends of the United States' foreign and domestic policy.

The Carter Administration's policy of exacerbating Soviet-American relations and the entire international situation has inevitably exerted a negative influence on the course of the SALT negotiations. Having been unable to discredit the SALT II Treaty in essence, the militaristic opposition within the United States began to undermine it by means of exacerbating the general political atmosphere. As a result, on the pretext of the events in Afghanistan, ratification of the SALT II Treaty has been postponed indefinitely, despite all the past arguments of the Democratic leadership in the need "to combine rivalry and cooperation in relations between the USSR and the United States" and contrary to statements concerning the importance of this treaty for the security of the United States itself.

This irresponsible step has placed the United States in a very difficult and all-round losing position. Of course, postponement of the treaty's ratification will not force the Soviet Union to cease assistance to the Afghan people. At the same time the terms of the SALT II Treaty, including those for which the United States had striven throughout a number of years past, will not acquire legal force. These limitations are considered important from the viewpoint of American "national security" and were even on the way to becoming an essential element of the United

United's military planning. Pointing to this fact, P. Wurme, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, writes: "We have not yet learned the first lesson of SALT II: that time is not working to our advantage and that delays in the arms limitation process threaten to reduce this process to nothing."²⁸ Consider also the deadlock which has arisen in the SALT sphere is not only spreading in the ranks of the traditional supporters of detente and arms limitation but is also being expressed by certain representatives of the United States' military leadership. The forces are dismally faced with the uncertainty which has arisen, which could give rise to the need to restructure established military policy with great financial and other costs.²⁹

Washington's policy in the strategic arms sphere and its approach to the SALT negotiations, which is subject of acute political struggle within the United States. And again we find here, for the causes of today's difficulties in stabilizing the military equilibrium and reducing the levels lie in the big problems which the American foreign policy and military-strategic course is encountering in an attempt to adapt to the objectively evolved nuclear parity between the USSR and the United States. At the same time it in precisely these circumstances, which are independent of Washington's will, despite all the attendant foreign and domestic policy measures, that the main character of the foreign and defense policies of the United States is oriented to prevent a strict strategic arms limitation by means of military technological development.

PRINCIPLES

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2. Even prior to the aggression in Vietnam the U.S. military budget had risen to approximately 50 billion dollars, which amounts to roughly 150 billion dollars in terms of the 1981 fiscal year ("Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981," p. 17).
3. L. V. Brezhnev, "Leninskij kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], vol. 2, Moscow, 1977, p. 101.
4. L. V. Brezhnev, "Offensive Missiles," Stockholm, SIPRI, 1974, pp. 20-21.
5. L. V. Brezhnev, Op. cit., vol. 6, Moscow, 1978, p. 582.
6. *Pravda*, 26 June 1980.
7. This program contains, among other things, sharp attacks on the Democratic administration for its allegedly inadequate efforts in increasing the military budget and the United States' strategic potential and condemns the abandonment of the B-1 strategic bomber and postponement of the deployment of the new MR missiles (see, for example, THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 July 1980).

8. J. Schlesinger, "Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budget and FY 1976-1980 Defense Program," Wash., 1975, pp II-4.
9. "Briefing on Counterforce Attacks," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Wash., 1974, pp 11-12.
10. "Department of Defense FY 1976 and 1977 Report," pp 11-28.
11. Can also be translated as "counterbalance" or "counterweight" strategy.
12. "The SALT II Treaty," pt 1, p 303.
13. Ibid., p 450.
14. "Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces," Congressional Budget Office, Wash., January 1978, pp 9-22.
15. "The SALT II Treaty," pt 3, p 75.
16. "Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981," p 88.
17. Ibid., pp 125-126.
18. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6, 18, 24 August 1980; THE WASHINGTON POST, 22 August 1980.
19. "Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981," p 88.
20. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1979, p 319.
21. "SALT II and the Costs of Modernizing U.S. Strategic Forces," Wash., 1979, p 5.
22. Quoted in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 October 1979.
23. "Joint Soviet-American Statement on the Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Strategic Arms Limitation Talks" (PRAVDA, 19 June 1979).
24. PRAVDA, 7 October 1979.
25. The "nuclear threshold" determines the stage of the conflict when the West plans to switch from conventional military operations to the use of nuclear weapons. "Escalation dominance" signifies a strategy of transferring the conflict to increasingly high levels of escalation, at which the West counts on having superiority over the enemy.
26. "FY 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements," Wash., June 1978, p 42.
27. It is believed that communications with submarines are less reliable and that ballistic missile submarines are insufficiently accurate, while aircraft require many hours of flight time to reach the target.

28. P. Warnke, "Some Lessons of SALT I," Chicago, 1979, p. 3.

29. The example of the MX program is typical in this respect. According to one authoritative study of the U.S. Congress, if a SALT III agreement is concluded after 1985 (the period of deployment of the MX ICBM), the program will cost \$5-43 billion dollars, which roughly coincides with the present estimates of the Defense Department. But if the SALT talks are broken off, under the conditions of an unlimited arms race the program would require, in order to perform its strategic assignments, appropriations of up to 100 billion dollars ("SALT II and the Costs of Modernizing U.S. Strategic Forces," p. 26).

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THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

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[Article by Peter Raichani, department head at the Hungarian Institute of International Relations]

[Text] The question of U.S. positions and strategy in connection with changes in the correlation of social forces in the Western European countries, primarily in relation to the growing strength of the communist parties, became a particularly important item on the agenda of U.S. relations with Western Europe in the 1970's.

The communist movement's effect on public life in the majority of Western European countries became noticeably more pronounced in the last decade, its mass base broadened, its ranks were supplemented considerably and it became a constructive force which must be taken into account by ruling groups in these states. Some communist parties neared participation in government while others have already participated or are now participating in coalition governments.

Disturbed by the leftward shift in public attitudes, imperialist and reactionary forces launched a broad offensive against the communist and workers parties. This offensive is being led by U.S. ruling circles. Washington's numerous attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of specific countries for the purpose of keeping communists out of government prove how deeply these circles are disturbed by the prospect of the further reinforcement of leftist influence in Western Europe.¹

In the view of the Western European communist parties, the United States is only one, although an important one, of many external factors affecting their struggle for social reforms in their countries. Naturally, the communists are primarily basing the choice of strategy and tactics on analyses of the correlation of class forces within their countries, but they are also constantly aware of the direct or indirect influence of the United States on developments in these countries.

Washington, on the other hand, tries to view the place, significance and role of the Western European communist parties in a broader context: firstly, from the standpoint of its approach to the international communist movement as a whole; secondly, in line with its strategic assumption that it is extremely necessary for the United States to preserve the alliance with Western Europe and keep it within the capitalist system and that if changes should take place here, this will strike a blow at capitalism's most important buttress; thirdly, with a view to events in other parts of the world resulting from changes in Western Europe (for example,

the disintegration of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa had a direct effect on U.S. global military and strategic interests). American ideologues and politicians take all of this into account.

In elaborating a strategy of struggle against the growing influence of the communist parties in the sociopolitical life of several Western European states, the United States was first guided by "traditional" considerations, but these traditional means did not bring about the anticipated results in the specific atmosphere of the Western European countries. Moreover, Washington officials could see that the process of elaborating an anticommunist strategy was time-consuming and that it necessitated consideration of the experience and proposals of other Western countries which knew more about actual conditions in their states.

The Portuguese Question: The events in Portugal after April 1974 served as a point of departure in the elaboration of today's American strategy in relations with Western European parties. During this stage, the basic line was the attempt to drive representatives of the Portuguese Communist Party out of government and prevent communists in other countries from entering government. This main line, however, was supplemented by several other elements. The most important was the hope that as some of the communist parties acquired power, they would, under the pressure of various circumstances, depart more and more from their Marxist-Leninist base, gradually undergo "social democratization" and ultimately have little in common with the real communist movement.

During the years of the fascist dictatorship in Portugal, the U.S. foreign policy establishment never attempted a comprehensive analysis of domestic conditions in this nation. It was completely satisfactory to American politicians that Portugal was conducting a consistently pro-American policy, was an obedient member of NATO and, what is more, was the kind of ally that would guarantee the protection and materialization of U.S. (Western) strategic interests, not only in Europe but also in its extensive African colonies.

The Portuguese revolution created a qualitatively new, but not entirely unexpected (for the objective observer), situation. Senator G. McGovern noted the following in a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: "The growing strength of the communist parties in Italy, France and Spain by the mid-1970's created the tangible possibility of participation by these parties in government. In spring 1974 the Portuguese revolution suddenly brought the communists into the government of a NATO country. Although American politicians can be excused for failing to foresee this course of events, we cannot say that the events themselves were completely unexpected."²

After Caetano's fascist dictatorship was overthrown in April 1974, American analyses focused on two aspects: expected changes in Africa and the possibility of integrating Portugal within Western Europe after the collapse of the fascist dictatorship.

The ideas of Portuguese General Spinola, who headed the new government, measured up to U.S. expectations in many ways. What were they? Portugal should not abandon the colonies completely, but should create a flexible "community of states" under its own aegis. At the same time, Portugal should strengthen its ties with the European Economic Community. These plans were supported by the United States,

firstly, because it felt that its global military and strategic interests would be secured until such time as the colonies, including the Portuguese colonies, would be exclusively governed by socialist-oriented liberation movements; secondly, because the ties between international big capital and Portuguese capitalists held out hope, in Washington's opinion, for the continued utilization of the colonies' national wealth in the U.S. interest; thirdly, because the accelerated reorganization of the Portuguese economy and the centralization and concentration of its capital would heighten the possibility of Portuguese capital's entry into the EEC and cooperation with it.

Portuguese democratic forces, however, had a different answer to the colonial question. Spinola and his ideas failed. The progressive approach to the question of colonial independence could prevail only in a struggle to keep the Portuguese grand bourgeoisie and international imperialism, especially the United States, from satisfying their thirst for power. This struggle therefore had a tremendous effect on the development of the situation in Portugal and on subsequent interrelations between the United States and this country.

The victory won by progressive forces in the colonial question helped to oust the "liberal" conservative bourgeoisie from government. Taking this into account, the United States began to rely primarily on the Portuguese Socialist Party. This party also enjoyed the support of the Western European social-democratic parties, which regarded it as a guarantor of the nation's capitalist development. Washington believed that Western European social democrats, particularly the West German SPD and England's Labor Party, had a better chance of influencing the PSP [Portuguese Socialist Party]. Steps were simultaneously taken to exert military pressure on this nation: Portugal's participation in NATO, especially in the nuclear planning group, was limited on the pretext that there were communists in the Portuguese Government.

After the communist party withdrew from government, U.S. ruling circles increased their pressure on Lisbon.³ Above all, they tried to ensure the continued use of bases on the Azores. External imperialist forces began to exert increasing pressure in other spheres as well. Economic and financial pressure on Portugal was intensified first. What is more, the PSP, which was in power, and other, rightist parties believed that Portugal's economic problems could only be solved with the aid of "external forces." The communique on the NATO Council session of 12 December 1979 specifically mentions military aid to Portugal. The heads of the IMF and IBRD and the American President announced that they were inclined to extend large loans only on the condition that the private sector would continue to develop in Portugal.

American experts and politicians viewed economic aid as the most effective means of pressure and, for this reason, they tried to attach political conditions to it during all stages of the revolutionary process. In a description of the strategy of Washington's struggle against the Portuguese Communist Party, J. Campbell, from the New York Council on Foreign Relations, said that all forces were involved in this struggle--"from conservatives to socialists." His words sound almost like an appeal: "Mario Soares and the socialists...need the moral and financial support of strong socialist parties in Europe."⁴ The same condition--the exclusion of communists from government--was also set by the EEC countries, which declared that they would "resolutely and generously assist Portugal, but only after unequivocal steps

are taken in the direction of democratic pluralism.⁵ A report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that the United States wholeheartedly supported Portugal's membership in the EEC, believing that within the Common Market it would be easier to liquidate the democratic gains of the revolution and completely restore the state-monopoly order in Portugal.

Economic assistance and the flow of foreign capital into Portugal did not improve the situation. Portugal's foreign debt now amounts to 5.6 billion dollars. In the 4 years that the PSP was in power, it was unable to bring about "stabilization" in the political sphere even after coalition governments were formed with participation by rightist parties. The American press applauded the victory of the rightist parties in the December 1979 election as a guarantee of "political stability" in Portugal.⁶

At the same time, the Portuguese Communist Party's vigorous efforts to defend the democratic gains of the April revolution and the Constitution, as well as its considerable influence on the masses, still constituted the main obstacle Washington encountered in its efforts to stabilize the situation in Portugal on its own terms.

The French Communist Party as a "Special Case": The U.S. strategy which took shape as a result of the events in Portugal included the following objectives:

Firstly, to take specific measures against the Western European communist parties, aimed at intensifying "Atlantic cooperation" and at involving all anticommunist forces of the region in this process;

Secondly, to rely primarily on the social democrats, wherever possible, because the leading parties of the Socialist International opposed the creation of coalition governments with communist participation (in this sense, the Portuguese Socialist Party differed little from the "northern" social-democratic parties and governed a nation with the aid of bourgeois logic,⁷ Soviet researcher B. S. Orlov pointed out);

Thirdly, to make more active use of financial and economic means and less use of pressure through NATO channels;

Fourthly, to make a vigorous attempt, wherever possible, to influence the Western European communist parties ideologically in the U.S. interest.

The American approach to the French Communist Party (FCP) reveals another aspect of U.S. anticommunist strategy: attempts to undermine the alliance of leftist forces.⁸ According to American appraisals, the origination and functioning of the alliance of leftist forces were made possible primarily by the constructive line of the FCP. This alliance helped to strengthen the influence of the FSP [French Socialist Party], but it simultaneously engendered growing uncertainty in the West, particularly in the United States, as to the political steps the socialists would take if they ever should come to power.

A few months before the 1978 elections in France, U.S. ruling circles gave some thought to the "Portuguese experience" and the complex situation in Italy and decided to do everything within their power to prevent communist participation in

the French Government. The FSP leaders were given a strong hint that if it was possible to create a minority government consisting of Socialist Party representatives in Portugal, it would be completely possible in France as well. At the same time, it was implied that an alliance with the communists would supposedly undermine the respectability of the Socialist Party and that the United States was willing to accept a socialist government, but not if the socialists were allied with the FCP. Socialist Party leaders were receptive to this pressure. They gradually arrived at the belief that a specific voting ratio and the support of the SPD (which had been improving relations with the FSP since 1977; in particular, joint task forces were set up to research Western European integration and aspects of social policy)⁹ and other Western European social-democratic parties would give them a real chance of winning the election.

This did not lead the FSP to victory. Washington, however, attained its chief objective: Representatives of the FCP were not admitted to the government and the alliance of leftist forces actually disintegrated, even though many American researchers are not completely excluding the possibility of its revival in France in some form or another. This prospect was discussed, in particular, by both H. Sonnenfeldt and S. Hoffman at hearings on Western Europe before the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives.¹⁰ They believe that the 1981 presidential campaign in France could become one of the stages in the restoration of the leftist alliance--although much will depend on the results of the Giscard d'Estaing government's economic experiments and the general situation in Europe. American experts are not concealing their apprehension that the FCP could, considering the experience of the recent past, play a more important role than before in the new alliance.

Attitude Toward the Spanish Communist Party: The development of the revolution in Portugal and the approaching collapse of the Spanish fascist dictatorship increased U.S. ruling circles' worries about the situation in Spain. American experts were primarily concerned with discovering the general and specific, in contrast to Portugal, features of the atmosphere in Spain, the alignment of class forces in this country and the significance of existing ties with the United States to these forces. Studies noted that although Spain was in a more favorable economic position than Portugal, since 1973 economic difficulties had been mounting here as well, the cost of living was rising, the number of unemployed had passed the 1-million mark. At the same time, the superior (in comparison to Portugal) development of modern heavy industry has resulted in a more highly organized working class. When American experts assess the balance of class power and the domestic political situation in Spain, they usually have to admit the impossibility of "saving" the Franco regime without Franco.

In 1975 and 1976, American policy toward Spain became more active for two reasons. Above all, the United States was trying to separate the processes of social changes in Spain and Portugal by weakening the Portuguese revolution's radical effect on the neighboring country. Secondly, as it had once been impossible to draw Spain into the NATO framework, Washington was trying to strengthen bilateral U.S.-Spanish relations in the economic and military spheres. Direct U.S. capital investments in Spain exceeded 750 million dollars in 1975; in January 1976 a new American-Spanish treaty, openly directing the two sides to engage in more active military cooperation, was signed.¹¹ The legal documentation of the American military presence in Spain was supposed to promote its "stabilization" on a state-monopoly basis in the post-Franco era and strengthen NATO's south European flank, which had been weakened by sociopolitical changes.

At the beginning of the transition period after the fall of the Franco regime, top U.S. leaders supported the policy and plans of leading circles in Spain in an attempt to complicate the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party (SCP) or at least to limit its freedom of action. By the second half of 1976, however, the United States was already hinting to Spain, as the American press reported, that it would be wise to permit communist party activity "for the purpose of revealing its weaknesses." It was not until 9 April 1977, however, that the Suarez government decided to legalize the SCP. In terms of the number of votes won in the June 1977 election, the communists became Spain's third-ranked party. Washington was disturbed by this, and many American researchers, the mass media and official and semiofficial publications began to stress that it was absolutely unacceptable for the Spanish Communist Party to play the same kind of role in this nation's leftist movement as the Italian Communist Party was playing in Italy.

After the election, Washington's approach to the SCP changed, and this change points up another facet of Washington's general line in regard to the Western European communist parties--the attempt to set them in opposition to other segments of the international communist movement, especially the ruling parties in the countries of the socialist community. American researchers and the mass media, reflecting the "liberal" position, are focusing attention on the particular statements by SCP Secretary General S. Carrillo that cast some doubt on real socialism's ability to solve various international problems and express views that are contrary to, or inconsistent with, the line of other communist and workers parties. What is more, bourgeois propaganda is making extensive use of such remarks to allege that there is "no national basis" for the construction of a socialist society in industrially developed capitalist countries, and that the social-democratic model is more in line with their conditions. It further alleges that some figures in a number of Western European communist parties are definitely leaning toward this model. It was no coincidence that American reviews of S. Carrillo's book "Eurocommunism and the State" suggested that the author was promoting a socialism of a "specifically Western European regional type."¹² Washington's view of the SCP's stand on international issues was extremely onesided, stressing that the party felt it was essential for Europe to exist as an independent factor in world politics. American propaganda began to display heightened interest in the Spanish communists, seizing upon and "sensationalizing" any signs of disagreement or discord within the SCP or in its relations with other communist parties. Some indefinite or vaguely worded provisions in the SCP program were also used for speculative purposes.

Nonetheless, and this should be emphasized, despite isolated attempts to play up to "Eurocommunism" and draw a contrast between "good" and "bad" communists, Washington's generally negative line in regard to the possible participation of Spanish communists in a coalition government did not change. It should also be noted that the SCP resolutely protested Washington's intervention in the internal life of certain Western European states several times, particularly the U.S. attempts to influence the intraparty affairs of communists in the Western European countries; it has appealed for the total resistance of this intervention. The SCP opposes membership in NATO for Spain, feeling that this would be contrary to national interests and could make Spain even more dependent on the United States. When the Standing Committee of the SCP Central Committee analyzed the international situation in October 1979, it described American foreign policy, particularly in connection with the decision to deploy medium-range missiles in Western Europe, as

policy "stimulating tension" and pursuing the goal of "strengthening the United States' faltering leadership in the imperialist world."

The Italian Communist Party: There is no other communist party in Western Europe whose activity has been as thoroughly and closely observed by the American analytical establishment. There are several reasons for this: The ICP is the largest communist party in Western Europe and has a great deal of influence with the masses (it is supported by around one-third of the voting public); ICP activity is based on a carefully worked out theoretical foundation which often serves other Western European communist parties as a point of departure in the planning of strategy and tactics; it possesses a substantial, although not deciding, share of political authority (on the parliamentary and local levels); in view of the fact that Italy plays an important military-strategic and political role in the NATO system, many American experts and politicians believe (although this belief is not shared by all) that communist participation in the government could stimulate radical change in the social status quo in capitalist Europe and, consequently, the international balance of power.

In the mid-1970's, two main groups took shape in American assessments of the possible role of the ICP in the Italian political structure. One believes that participation by the Italian communists in governing their nation is conceivable under certain conditions (some go even further and feel that this would be "helpful"), while representatives of the other group categorically assert that any kind of participation by the ICP in the Italian Government would be unacceptable and catastrophic from the standpoint of U.S. interests. Six main aspects are examined in these studies:

The nature of the party; the ICP and the international communist movement, particularly relations between the ICP and CPSU; the ICP's attitude toward NATO; the ICP's view on courses of Western European development and the so-called "Atlantic community"; socioideological matters (democracy, pluralism and so forth); internal political conditions in Italy, the conditions of national government and the class balance of power.

Under which conditions do American authors believe that participation by the ICP in the government would be acceptable? Above all, they feel that the ICP "must" fully meet the requirements of bourgeois democracy (including its internal workings), "integrate" fully into the existing Italian society, and through it into the "Atlantic community," and support NATO, the political (bourgeois) structure and, therefore, the political structure of the West in general (the EEC, NATO and so forth); its identification with the West must stand above ideological and class likes and dislikes. One of the main conditions for ICP participation in government is considered to be the denial of all Leninist principles and the severance of relations with the CPSU.

As for the present American leadership's stand, it is categorically against ICP participation in the Italian Government; in particular, President J. Carter has made numerous declarations to this effect.

American researchers do not agree on many other aspects of ICP strategy and tactics. They also have differing views as to the particular reforms the ICP will conduct after it comes to power. Relations between the ICP and the nations of the socialist community are also the subject of disagreements by experts. They all agree,

however, that if ICP representatives should enter the government, and particularly if a communist government should be formed, it is probable that the capitalist order in Italy will change. This is the main issue from the standpoint of the interests and values of bourgeois society, and on this point all American analysts and politicians are unanimously of the opinion that this turn of events would be absolutely unacceptable.

It is indicative that American researchers who analyzed the role of the ICP prior to the 1970's assumed that, in spite of its growing ranks and increasing influence in Italian politics, it could not occupy a position equal to that of the Christian Democratic Party. Later, the question of how the ICP was "integrating" into the contemporary Italian political structure became the central issue.¹³ In the last 5 or 6 years, American researchers have closely observed the nature of ICP activity, carefully noting the changes (real or imaginary) in its views. During this process they casually set forth--sometimes in the form of advice, and sometimes in the form of demands--the principles or tenets the ICP allegedly "must" accept if it is to become a "truly democratic" (in their definition) party. For example, S. Berger says that the ICP is gradually broadening its social base in the interests of "Italy's path toward socialism."¹⁴ In another study on the role and strategy of the ICP, Ohio State University Professor G. Sani concludes that the social composition of the voters supporting the ICP does not correspond to the classic class structure--that is, that the ICP is supported by more than just the working class. What is more, "the social composition of its supporters," he writes, "differs little from the social profile of those who support the Christian Democratic Party."¹⁵

The majority of American studies, however, still repudiate the ICP because its program and policy are aimed at the attainment of ideals that are absolutely unacceptable to U.S. ruling circles. This was quite candidly stated in the well-known U.S. State Department announcement of 12 January 1978. Participation by the ICP in government would only be acceptable to bourgeois circles in the United States and the Western European countries if the ICP "agreed" to actively defend the bourgeois values of capitalist society, preserve the capitalist order and not advocate its Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary transformation.

Judging by a number of reports in the American press, Washington feels that its strategy in relation to the Western European communist movement is successful on the whole.¹⁶ "Signs of Eurocommunism's demise have already appeared on the horizon" and "Eurocommunism as a united political force has ceased to exist,"¹⁷ B. Pfaff, S. Lewis and others have announced.

The American leadership's basic yardstick of "success" was its ability to prevent communist participation in Western European governments in the 1970's. American ruling circles have declared that the reinforcement of the North Atlantic alliance is one of the chief goals of their foreign policy and they regard these communist parties as the main obstacle blocking their way to this goal. In their opinion, curbing the process of detente will not only prevent the socialist countries from acquiring more influence in the system of international relations, but will also considerably weaken the Western European communist movement.

But was this painstakingly engineered strategy of struggle against the communist parties really "successful"? The United States is incapable of eradicating the

growing influence of the communist parties on the masses (this is attested to by the last elections in Portugal and France), just as it cannot prevent the communist parties from surveying their achievements, learning the proper lessons from their errors and adapting their strategy and tactics to present conditions. Congresses and conferences of the PCP, ICP, SCP and other Western European communist and workers parties, national conferences, and bilateral and multilateral communist party meetings to discuss problems and experience in struggle under present conditions have been, and will continue to be, suitable forums for this work.

The basic interests of the socialist countries and the communist parties of Western Europe coincide in the struggle to guarantee security in Europe and the rest of the world, to preserve and strengthen the policy of detente and to effect social progress. The present U.S. leadership's program for the buildup of weapons in Europe is arousing protests and appropriate actions from all of the communist parties in this region. They realize that a new round in the arms race will increase tension in Europe and that the reinforcement of NATO is one of Washington's most important instruments in the struggle against Western European communists.

The decisions of the 36th Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain state, for example, that the party must immediately take steps to activate the English peace movement because the deployment of cruise missiles and other nuclear means of delivery in England carries the threat of a nuclear catastrophe of even greater dimensions.

Representatives of the FCP demanded that the NATO Council decision to deploy U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe be condemned in the French National Assembly. The FCP declared that "the presence of these missiles near our territory would be extremely dangerous and would lead to a serious imbalance in favor of imperialism in the correlation of forces on the European and global levels. These plans, which will give new impetus to the arms race, can only be thwarted by means of struggle."¹⁸

When E. Berlinguer addressed a joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the ICP, he stressed that "we communists must first make the broad masses fully aware of this extremely dangerous situation and of the need for people's war in Italy and in Europe for detente, peace and disarmament."¹⁹

The undertakings of communist parties and other peace-loving forces have always been an effective means of struggle against the arms race. The meeting of European communist and workers parties for peace and disarmament in Paris in April 1980 was particularly significant in this respect. The "Communist Appeal to the European People for Peace and Disarmament," adopted at this meeting, sets forth a specific program of action, methods and guidelines for struggle against the continuation of the arms race and against the threat of war. As B. N. Ponomarev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, candidate for membership in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and head of a CPSU delegation, said in an address in Paris, this meeting "could represent an exceptionally timely good beginning for future collective action by the fraternal parties of Europe" in their struggle for a Europe distinguished by peace, security and cooperation.²⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. This matter is discussed in detail, with events in Portugal and Italy serving as illustrative material, in the following: V. A. Kremenyuk and A. D. Portnyagin, "The United States and Events in Portugal" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 10, 1974); N. V. Melikhova, "Italy: Washington Alarmed" (*Ibid.*, No 9, 1979); P. A. Vares, "Washington Interference in Italian Affairs" (*Ibid.*, No 11, 1979).
2. "Revolution into Democracy. Portugal After the Coup," A Report by Senator G. McGovern to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Wash., August 1976, p 85.
3. The forms of NATO pressure are discussed in detail in papers compiled for the Ninth Congress of the Portuguese Communist Party (AVANTE!, 26 April 1979).
4. J. Campbell, "The Mediterranean Crisis," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1975, pp 615, 616.
5. Quoted in "Revolution into Democracy," p 74.
6. See, for example, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 6, 7 December 1979.
7. See B. S. Orlov, "Social Democrats in the 1970's: New Trends, Old Conflicts," RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR, No 2, 1979, p 147.
8. For more detail, see A. F. Gorelova and Yu. P. Davydov, "The United States and Leftist Forces in Western Europe," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 2, 1978--Editor's note.
9. In her article, A. Yergin writes about many points of agreement in U.S. and SPD interests in regard to the "French question": resolute anticomunism, an emphasis on pressuring the FSP to restrict its dealings with the FCP, the need to draw France closer to NATO (Angela Yergin, "West Germany's Sudpolitik: Social Democrats and Eurocommunism," ORBIS, Spring 1979, p 67).
10. "Western Europe in 1978. Political Trends and U.S. Policy," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Wash., 1978, pp 43, 95.
11. See V. S. Shein, "'New' Approach to Spain," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 12, 1976--Editor's note.
12. J. Goldborough, "Eurocommunism After Madrid," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1977, p 812.
13. A typical example of this kind of analysis can be found in "Communism in Italy and France," edited by D. Blackmer and S. Tarrow, Princeton, 1975.
14. S. Berger, "Italy on the Threshold or the Brink?"—"Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership," edited by D. Landes, Lexington, 1977, pp 224-226.

15. G. Santi, "The PCI on the Threshold," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, November-December 1976, p 30.
16. P. Lang and M. Vanicelli, "Carter in the Italian Maze," FOREIGN POLICY, No 33, Winter 1978/79, p 16.
17. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 29 April 1979; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 16 April 1979.
18. L'HUMANITE, 23 November 1979.
19. L'UNITA, 4 July 1979.
20. PRAVDA, 29 April 1980.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF RELATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 51-61

[Article by N. N. Bolkhovitinov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN REVIEW

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 62-67

[Article by N. P. Popov]

[Text] The election campaign has come to an end in the United States. The time has come for the voters to have their say, and not the political brokers--activists from the two bourgeois parties and the representatives of influential circles backing them up. But the fact that none of the candidates appeal to the voters is the problem with this campaign.

So many criticizing, and even contemptuous, remarks about J. Carter and his administration have been made during the campaign that we can only wonder how the target of these remarks could have governed the nation for a whole 4 years. "It is an inept and ill-fated administration," A. Lewis wrote, for example, in a NEW YORK TIMES article, "and the fault does not lie only in Brzezinski's recklessness, but in the administration's policy on a number of economic and other issues. This is the real reason for the dissatisfaction with President Carter."

Above all, the President was justifiably criticized for the pitiful state of the nation's economy, for the unemployment rate which once again went above the 8-percent mark, and for inflation, which measured 13.5 percent in 1979 and threatens to stay at the same level this year. The real wages of American workers are 1.5 percent lower than in 1965. The long-predicted recession began in spring 1980.

The President was able to temporarily divert public attention away from these problems by taking advantage of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. The atmosphere of a military camp was created in the nation, with characteristic relapses into jingoism and anti-Soviet hysteria: The Americans rallied round "the President and the flag." The administration's critics often had to hold their tongues during the winter and spring of the election year to avoid being called unpatriotic. This helped J. Carter to defeat Senator E. Kennedy in the primaries and to eventually guarantee his nomination at the Democratic Party convention in August.

The wave of chauvinism did not last long, however, and then the President's foreign policy activity also began to evoke public condemnation. In the summer and early autumn, Carter's general performance in the office of the presidency was approved by only 21-22 percent of the voters--the lowest indicator in the entire history of public opinion polling.

This low estimation of the President's performance and the scandal which broke out just before the convention in connection with the financial manipulations of the President's brother, Billy Carter, whose involvement in questionable dealings had been established, motivated influential forces in the Democratic Party, including members of Congress, to attempt to organize an "open" convention and nominate another candidate. The convention delegates who supported Carter, however, won the day. Most of them were non-professional political figures from the heartland who were carefully selected at the time of the primaries on the basis of their loyalty to the party leader; the President met and corresponded with them after the primaries as well. As a result, most of the delegates did not give in to the pressure of the Committee for an Open Convention and the politicians who supported E. Kennedy and they voted according to the distribution of votes in the primaries: 1,995 votes for Carter and 1,106 for Kennedy.

Republican candidate Ronald Reagan quite easily defeated his rivals in the primaries and invited the most persistent of them, G. Bush, to be his running mate.

In the minds of Americans, Reagan had always personified the conservative ideology and an extreme rightist approach to domestic and foreign policy issues. Besides this, Reagan's lack of experience in public administration, according to his critics, is combined with an oversimplified view of the nation's problems, contradictory beliefs and an inclination to improvise. His extreme conservatism, inexperience and adventuristic approach to foreign policy were the reasons for his minimal popularity with the voters and led to his defeat 4 years ago in the race against G. Ford for the Republican Party presidential nomination.

This year the images created by the press and the candidates themselves--the image of Reagan as a "consistent and firm conservative" and the image of Carter as a "moderate politician" with a relatively more liberal platform--created the semblance of a choice for the voters. But the differences in the views and platforms of the candidates dwindled as election day approached. Both candidates therefore had no other choice than to walk a political tightrope: On the one hand, they could not disillusion or frighten influential circles in big business, the military-industrial complex, their own party hierarchies and Zionist forces; on the other, each candidate had to appeal to the voters--workers, ethnic minorities, women and youth.

American politicians are not intimidated by such contradictory, if not mutually exclusive, goals. After all, in this nation promises and pledges are only alive until the November election, after which the master of the White House can behave however he likes--until the next election.

The American voter is concerned with two main spheres of policy--domestic and foreign. This was also the case in the present campaign. Militaristic tendencies have been mounting in the United States since the mid-1970's, and the fight against detente has been intensified. Rightists have made every effort to cure the Americans of the "Vietnam syndrome" and to fully restore the hegemonic attitudes and policy aimed at the attainment of military and political supremacy in the world. The 1980 campaign was a powerful stimulus for these tendencies.

In response to the pressure of militaristic circles and in an attempt to divert the attention of the voters away from mounting economic difficulties to the sphere of

foreign relations, President Carter frankly played up to rightist forces in this election year; he authorized dramatic increases in the defense budget, shelved the ratification of the SALT II Treaty and endeavored to subvert the process of detente. Instead of winning the approval of the Republican Party's right wing, however, he became the target of new accusations--of weakness, of being "soft toward the Russians" and of lagging behind the Soviet Union in the military sphere.

The Republicans used these accusations as an important trump card in the campaign. The openly militaristic platform they adopted at the party convention calls for military superiority to the USSR and envisages the construction and deployment of MX missiles, the strategic B-1 bomber, strategic cruise missiles and the neutron bomb. Reagan announced that he would give the Pentagon generals any weapon they want.

Trying to keep up with the Republicans, the Democrats outlined an equally "impressive" arms race plan in their platform: the same MX complex, Trident nuclear submarines, cruise missiles, strategic missiles in Europe and "rapid deployment forces." Discarding its previous beliefs about the need to maintain strategic parity and the need for the limitation and subsequent reduction of nuclear stockpiles, the Carter Administration actually resolved to attain military superiority to the Soviet Union. Directive No 59 on U.S. nuclear strategy, substantiating the possibility of "limited" nuclear war and signed by the President, is a militaristic act with far-reaching consequences and a calculated campaign impact.

The voters virtually have no choice--they can either have an arms race (Republican-style) or a weapons buildup (Carter-style).

In the domestic political sphere, Reagan had to engage in maneuvers of relatively grander scales to reach the center of the political spectrum and to correct the workers' impression that he was an excessively zealous protector of big business interests, which he actually is.¹ Although the Republican economic program focused on weakening government control over economic processes and corporate activity, repealing the tax on the superprofits of oil monopolies, balancing the budget at the expense of social programs and turning these programs over to state government control, the plan to reduce taxes over a period of 3 years was also widely advertised and appealed to many Americans (even though big business will reap the final benefits from this undertaking). Addressing the delegates at a conference of the National Urban League, representing the interests of blacks and other ethnic minorities, Reagan assured them that he was not a "caricature of a conservative" or the enemy of "the blacks, the poor and the underprivileged." Outlining his program to "improve the quality of life in the American cities," he passionately exclaimed: "I promise to defend the civil rights of black Americans."

The Republicans' courting of the black voters was not ignored, particularly in view of the profound disillusionment of the latter with the present administration. As Vice President J. Jacob of the National Urban League stressed, the black vote which carried Jimmy Carter to victory in 1976 is "not in anyone's pocket" in 1980.

1. According to the data of L. Harris, in summer 1980, 56 percent of the potential voters described R. Reagan as a conservative, but only 39 percent of the respondents called themselves conservatives.

Whereas Reagan's arsenal in the struggle for votes consisted mainly of promises and rhetoric, J. Carter used all of his possibilities as an incumbent to heighten the prestige of the administration and to win votes. The measures he took included a federal aid program for the United Automobile Workers, who had suffered particularly severe effects from the economic crisis, and the allocation of more than a billion dollars to raise the purchase price of wheat, which slightly diminished the dissatisfaction of farmers who were suffering from the embargo on the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union. The highlight of the program in the last weeks of the campaign was the plan for "economic renewal," which was supposed to renovate industry, raise productivity, solve the energy problem and create "millions, millions and millions" of new jobs. The cost of implementing this grand plan, which is expected to take 10 years, should exceed, according to its authors, the combined cost of the program to put man on the moon, the nationwide highway system and the Marshall Plan. Many political observers expected something of the kind from J. Carter: He had to propose some kind of grand-scale program at the end of his term to stop the catastrophic decline of his popularity. The "economic renewal" plan, which has been advertised as "something just short of" Johnson's "Great Society" program, would probably be even more impressive if the author of this plan had not made equally sunny--and equally impracticable--promises 4 years ago.

With his criticism of the administration and the Republicans, independent candidate Anderson won some support, particularly from voters unaffiliated with either party. Public opinion polls indicated that the majority (64 percent) saw J. Anderson as a "bright new figure in national politics" and believed that he was "not afraid to tell the truth and call a spade a spade" (this response was one of the choices offered in the polls); 66 percent agreed that he "does not make promises lightly, but frankly tells the voters about the difficulties they will have to face and the sacrifices they will have to make"; 57 percent believed that he was a man of "great integrity."

Anderson's support, however, was not strong enough. General Secretary Gus Hall of the Communist Party of the United States of America defined his position in the following way: "The problem with Anderson's candidacy is that he is only formally an independent candidate. This is not political independence.... He still holds many conservative and reactionary views." Anderson did not represent any kind of specific current or any kind of independent force, not to mention a party; he was, according to G. Hall, a "date with backing" and he was not even considering the subversion of the system.

The present campaign was characterized by attitudes toward opinion polls. Successive indecision of the masses why most observers took the presidential candi-

uished by the rapidly changing, from week to week and toward issues, judging by the data of public and foreign policy "crises" heightened the instability of their views and attitudes. This is also approach to the rising and falling popularity of

In spring and summer the commotion over foreign policy "crises" began to die down and the economy once again took the leading place among American problems and concerns. In August, Americans felt that the following were the "most important problems facing the nation" (according to a Gallup poll, in percentages):

The high cost of living.....	56
Unemployment.....	15
International problems.....	12
Dissatisfaction with government....	8
Energy problems.....	6, etc.

What is more, the Americans' evaluation of presidential activity to solve these problems was extremely low. Carter's performance in the economic sphere was given a positive evaluation by 15 percent and a negative one by 83 percent; the respective figures for other spheres were 16 percent and 81 percent for presidential efforts to solve the unemployment problems, 20 percent and 78 percent in foreign policy, and 19 percent and 79 percent for general effectiveness and the President's ability to "finish the job he started."

In connection with this, many observers believed that R. Reagan simply had to wait for the proper moment when the voters would completely reject their disgraced President and turn to Reagan as an alternative. Polls conducted in spring and summer of this year largely corroborated this assumption. The distribution of voter support for R. Reagan, J. Carter and independent candidate J. Anderson was the following in these months (in percentages):

	Reagan	Carter	Anderson
March	38	38	22
April	39	33	23
June	43	28	17
July	43	34	16

After Reagan had secured the nomination at the Republican Party convention in July, his voter support indicator rose even more while the President's popularity continued to decline--largely in connection with the scandal resulting from his brother's unscrupulous behavior. As a result, the gap between Reagan and Carter widened to 27 percent, according to the Harris service, by the end of July. When the Democratic convention began, the gap had dwindled once again to 19 percent in the Harris polls and 14 percent in the Gallup polls. A July Harris poll indicated that Carter would be defeated even by Anderson (on the whole, however, the appraisal of Anderson's chances is low: In June, only 22 percent of the voters believed that he had a chance of winning the election, and in August the figure had dropped to a mere 2 percent).

Carter's nomination as the Democratic Party candidate at the convention in August as a result of his victory over E. Kennedy contributed to an increase in his voter support; by the beginning of September he was only a few percentage points behind Reagan.

The fluctuation of voter support indicators continued. After all, as we have already pointed out, neither candidate actually appeals to the voters. Only 44-45 percent of the voters polled expressed "firm" support for either of the two leading candidates.

The decline in support for the President and for other Democratic leaders was an important tendency in the last months of the campaign. This particularly disturbed the Democratic senators, members of the House of Representatives and state

governors who expected to be re-elected in November. As Republican G. Vander Jagt, member of the House of Representatives from Michigan, said in July, "we need 59 votes to control the House of Representatives. Six months ago I would have been satisfied if we had won 20 of these seats. Now I do not exclude the possibility of winning all 59."

The correlation of voters who are registered Democrats and Republicans failed long ago to provide a clear indicator of whether the Republicans could win a victory of such broad dimensions. In the last 30 years the number of registered Democrats decreased 6 percent and the number of Republicans decreased 4 percent while the number of independents rose to 30 percent. The correlation of Democrats, Republicans and independents is 47:27:24 according to Gallup data, 43:25:31 according to CBS, and 39:32:26 according to Harris data. If we consider the fact that Democrats prevail among those who do not vote and that only slightly more than half of the voters take advantage of this right, the Republicans' hopes look somewhat justified. Besides this (although according to the tendentious data of R. Tieter, a public opinion expert from the Republican camp), 53 percent of the voters believe that the Republicans are more capable of curbing inflation, 58 percent feel that they can control government spending more effectively, and the majority believe that the nation would be "better off" if the Republicans hold the majority in Congress.

Realizing that campaign rhetoric, the support of arms programs and threats and adventures in dealings with Iran would not win them votes, the leaders of the Democratic Party remembered at the last minute about detente and the SALT II treaty, which could become a real achievement of the current administration in its foreign policy activity. In the last weeks of the campaign, the voices of sober-minded Democrats could be heard calling for a vote on SALT II in the Senate prior to the end of the current congressional session and unrelated to the campaign. It was proposed that the problem of disarmament be stressed in debates with Republicans. But the moment for correcting past errors was gone: The Carter Administration decided that it would rather "score points" for a rightward shift in an attempt to appear more conservative than the "Reagan team."

Despite the abundance of expansive promises in both party platforms, the national political line for the next 4 years is still far from clear, and the struggle over its definition will not end with the election on 4 November. It is more likely that this will just be the beginning.

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WOMEN IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES

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[Article by E. G. Grigor'yev]

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FOREIGN BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES

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[Article by L. S. Khudyakova]

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THE PROBLEM OF 'TWO SECRETARIES OF STATE'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 83-86

[Article by A. I. Filatov: "Problems with 'Competition' in the Upper Echelon of Government"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the Carter Administration, the American press has frequently reported differences of opinion between Secretary of State C. Vance and the President's national security adviser, Z. Brzezinski. Vance's resignation in April 1980 as a result of his disagreement with the President's attempts to use military methods to solve the problem of the American hostages in Iran and with his approach to several other matters immediately provoked a flood of news reports, and later more detailed articles, analyzing interrelations within the government in regard to questions of U.S. foreign policy and the role and significance of the institutions of secretary of state and national security adviser.

A prominent place among these articles belongs to a work by renowned American expert on the foreign policy mechanism and author of several specialized studies, Carnegie Foundation researcher I. Destler, in which he analyzes the role of the President's national security adviser in detail.¹

Each of the men who have held this office in the last 20 years (M. Bundy, W. Rostow, B. Scowcroft, H. Kissinger and, now, Z. Brzezinski), the author of the article points out, was simultaneously (and Brzezinski still is) the head of the President's foreign policy system, officially under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council (NSC). With the support of President Nixon, H. Kissinger reached the zenith of authority when he used this office to dominate the engineering and implementation of foreign policy, thereby pushing Secretary of State W. Rogers into the background. Although three of them--M. Bundy, H. Kissinger and Z. Brzezinski--declared that their functions were purely administrative--the "simplification" of the President's decision-making--the experience of the last 20 years proves that their role far transcended the function of mere control over the flow of documents. The President's national security adviser has become an influential political official who defends a specific policy line, influences the decision-making process and conducts important international negotiations. By taking on these functions, the President's adviser has usurped many of the prerogatives of the secretary of state. The facts testify, I. Destler writes, that this periodically repeated tendency is not the result of "similar personality characteristics" (in the advisers), but that the reason lies much deeper: proximity to the President, high status and more opportunities to make use of government control levers.

The office was created in 1953 by President D. Eisenhower. According to plan, the author recalls, the adviser and the NSC staff he headed were to collect information and recommendations from various agencies, discover problems and bring them to the President's attention, prepare brief resumes of departmental documents for the President, analyze the drawbacks and benefits of proposed policy alternatives, control the implementation of presidential decisions and aid in the coordination of interdepartmental activity. But the adviser was supposed to avoid the management of foreign policy and he was to limit his public statements and refrain from supporting any specific view within the administration (with the exception of decisions already made by the President). In addition, the President's adviser was supposed to work with other senior advisers to Cabinet members to ease presidential decision making and implementation.

Destler admits that a high-ranking official could never fill all of these requirements to the letter and that even the most "disciplined adviser encounters situations in which he has to play a more substantial role." Nonetheless, the author feels, the national security adviser "should not become a maker of policy because this could seriously injure American foreign policy." The author lists the following among the injurious consequences of this kind of situation: tense relations with the secretary of state (whereas the adviser's primary function is to simplify the President's relations with the State Department); friction with the Congress, which begins to wonder, after seeing the adviser appear on such television programs as "Meet the Press" or "Face the Nation," why the secretary of state can be called to testify before Congress and the President's national security adviser cannot; confusion among allies and adversaries when they do not understand who is speaking in behalf of the United States; and so forth.

But U.S. foreign policy is injured most, Destler feels, when the President's adviser independently conducts diplomatic negotiations, as this precludes a "balanced exchange of opinions." Although the "political costs are obvious," the author states, "the development of the adviser's functions is following precisely this pattern." For example, M. Bundy supervised a "rescue" operation in the Dominican Republic (the U.S. Marines landed here in 1965 on the false pretext of "rescuing" American citizens--A. F.). Henry Kissinger dominated the negotiations with China and Vietnam and SALT during the first 4 years of Nixon's stay in the White House.

The American writer sees the root of the problem in the fact that four of the five men who have held this office were university professors and prominent experts on international relations (with the exception of Lieutenant-General B. Scowcroft). As long as the tradition of appointing an expert on political and strategic matters to the office of national security adviser, who has actually become the President's chief adviser on foreign policy matters, exists, i. Destler writes, the rivalry between this adviser and the secretary of state will continue. It is most probable, he concludes, that this will become established practice and the national security adviser will be one of the chief figures in the process of foreign policymaking.

If this tendency is irreversible, then the author feels that it would be best to make this office accountable to the Senate. For example, the Senate could approve appointments to this office in the same way that it approves the U.S. secretary of state appointed by the President and could then have the right to call the adviser to testify before congressional committees. The author cites a remark by Democratic Nebraska Senator E. Zorinsky: "It is obvious that we now have two secretaries of state...and the time has come to make the second one accountable to the Senate."

But the most effective way of solving the entire problem, according to Destler, would be to "completely abolish the office of national security adviser" as a presidential adviser on foreign policy matters. This would "guarantee clarity, consistency and responsibility" in the implementation of foreign policy. As for the management of the NSC and interdepartmental coordination, the author proposes that the office of NSC executive secretary be created to perform these indisputably important functions. Moreover, in his opinion, the secretary of state should take part in choosing candidates for this office.

Destler's views are disputed in the same issue of FOREIGN POLICY by another renowned American researcher, P. Szanton.² He agrees with Destler that someone has to coordinate the foreign policy process and that the persons who have served as national security adviser to date have performed the organizational function poorly. Szanton agrees that the adviser's functions should be limited and clearly defined, but he disagrees with Destler's conclusions regarding the advisory function, feeling that advice on foreign policy from other sources than the State Department or Department of Defense is useful. It is precisely this, he says, that should be the chief function of the head of the NSC (regardless of the title he is given): to rise above the departmental approach in matters pertaining to national security and to give the President balanced advice. In his opinion, "the two functions--administration and consultation--are of equal importance, both are legal and both can be successfully performed" if, firstly, the two main sections of the White House staff--on foreign and domestic policy--are combined into a single presidential staff (or cabinet), with the senior members providing the President with objective advice and with the executive secretary of the NSC and four or five assistants performing the functions of a secretariat; and secondly, if the President's adviser (or several advisers) on national security (and international economic matters) has his own staff, separate from the executive staff. "Balanced and objective management of the foreign policy decision-making process will not be achieved until the President's need for objective advice has also been filled," P. Szanton concludes.

It should be noted that questions connected with the organization of foreign policy management have been a matter of concern for American experts virtually since the time of the NSC's founding. The functions and role of the President's adviser and the NSC staff have been the central topic of practically all of the numerous studies on administrative organizational matters. Almost all of these studies have acknowledged the increasing influence of the national security adviser and the NSC staff in the foreign policymaking process and have recommended the limitation of their role in this process. The facts testify, however, that the "load must still be carried" and that the problem is even more acute today.

Many experts agree with I. Destler that the reasons for this state of affairs are institutional in nature. The President's adviser is the only official outranked by the President who is the recipient of information from various departments on a broad range of national security matters, pertaining to foreign, military and domestic policy. It should also be noted that, although the position of executive secretary is listed in the NSC staff roster, it has been vacant since 1968, when the considerable expansion of the national security adviser's functions began. Another fact is also pointed out by specialists who analyze the problem of the "two secretaries of state"; the U.S. State Department is not set up for a supervisory role in foreign policy decision making. At the same time, as F. Odin,

OMB official, written, the NSC staff "seems to have been specially designed for policymaking."³

In opposition to Szantó's proposal that the President's adviser be placed under congressional control, it must be noted that E. Zorinsky, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recently introduced a bill which would make Senate approval of appointments to the office of national security adviser compulsory and would give the Senate the right to call the adviser to testify before congressional committees; proposals of this kind have been made in the Congress in the past, but they were not given the necessary attention. This time as well, as the NEW YORK TIMES reported on 21 May, citing an official source: "The White House will oppose any attempt to demand compulsory Senate approval of the President's national security adviser and to obligate this adviser to testify before congressional committees." In general, it does not seem likely that the mere approval of this appointment by Congress could fundamentally solve the problem of the adviser's relations with the State Department. It is more likely that it will introduce even more friction into these relations. Szantó's suggestions, aimed primarily at strengthening the NSC staff, are not likely to solve the problem either.

The appointment of Senator E. Muskie to the office of secretary of state, just as correspondents predicted,⁴ did not solve the problem. For example, Muskie was not present at presidential Directive No 59, which was prepared by Brzezinski's staff and the Pentagon, although he, as the American press reported,⁵ attended one of the President's regular "foreign policy breakfasts" along with H. Brown and Z. Brzezinski on 25 July, the day the document was signed.

"It is still not completely clear who the main authority in the foreign policy system is, Muskie or Brzezinski," P. Gelb wrote in a NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE article. The same kind of confusion existed between C. Vance and Brzezinski; it interfered with the successful implementation of U.S. foreign policy in the last few years.⁶ Gelb, who also had to resign from a key position in the State Department as a result of conflicts with the national security adviser, agrees that this is not simply a struggle for power between individuals. "This struggle is part of the history of the rivalry between two institutions: the White House, represented by the national security adviser and his NSC staff, and the secretary of state along with the department he heads."⁶ he declared.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Szantó, "A Job That Doesn't Work," FOREIGN POLICY, No 38, Spring 1980, pp 86-88.
2. P. Szantó, "Two Jobs, Not One," FOREIGN POLICY, No 38, Spring 1980, pp 89-91.
3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 May 1980.
4. See, for example, THE WASHINGTON POST, 4 May 1980; TIME, 12 May 1980.
5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 August 1980.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 20 July 1980, p 26.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 'SOVIET THREAT': DOMESTIC SOURCES OF THE COLD WAR
CONSENSUS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 87-97

[Abridgement by V. I. Bogachev of the book "The Rise and Fall of the 'Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus" by Alan Wolfe, Arms Control Association, Washington, 1980]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1801

MOUNTING RIVALRY IN THE COMPUTER MARKET

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 98-108

[Article by G. B. Kochetkov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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BOOK REVIEWS

Poverty in the Developing Countries

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 109-112

[Review by A. G. Shchelkin of the book "The Nature of Mass Poverty" by J. K. Galbraith, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 1979, VIII + 150 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

The Carter Administration in Review

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 112-115

[Review by N. A. Sakharov of the book "The Carter Presidency and Beyond" by Laurence H. Shoup, Palo Alto (California), Ramparts Press, 1980, 319 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

Quality of U.S. Higher Education

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 115-117

[Review by L. A. Salycheva of the book "Disorders in Higher Education," The American Assembly, Englewood Cliffs (New Jersey), Columbia University, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979, 8 + 212 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

Economic Ties Between Developing and Capitalist Countries

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 117-118

[Review by Ye. P. Petrova of the book "Vnesheekonomicheskiye svyazi razvivayushchikhsya gosudarstv s kapitalisticheskimi stranami," edited by I. O. Farizov, Moscow, Izd-vo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1980, 253 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

American Social Psychology Today

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 118-119

[Review by A. F. Bobikov of the book "Sovremennaya sotsial'naya psichologiya SShA" by M. N. Shikhirev, Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 228 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

The American Technical University

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 p 119

[Review by I. N. Lesin of the book "Tekhnicheskiy universitet SShA" by B. A. Gontarev, Leningrad, Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1980, 122 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

Russian Foreign Policy of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 119-121

[Review by O. V. Orlik of the book "Vneshnyaya politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka. Dokumenty rossiyskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del," vol III (XI), Moscow, Nauka, 1975, 877 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

GUS HALL (A TRIBUTE ON HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 122-126

[Article by M. I. Lapitskiy]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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